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SMART CONTRACT

Security Audit Report

Project: 6OS Token
Platform: Ethereum
Language: Solidity
Date: August 29th, 2023

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THIS IS SECURITY AUDIT REPORT DOCUMENT AND WHICH MAY CONTAIN INFORMATION WHICH IS CONFIDENTIAL. WHICH INCLUDES ANY POTENTIAL VULNERABILITIES AND MALICIOUS CODES WHICH CAN BE USED TO EXPLOIT THE SOFTWARE. THIS MUST BE REFERRED INTERNALLY AND ONLY SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC AFTER ISSUES ARE RESOLVED.

Introduction

EtherAuthority was contracted by the 6OS team to perform the Security audit of the 6OS Token smart contract code. The audit has been performed using manual analysis as well as using automated software tools. This report presents all the findings regarding the audit performed on August 29th, 2023.

The purpose of this audit was to address the following:

- Ensure that all claimed functions exist and function correctly.
- Identify any security vulnerabilities that may be present in the smart contract.

Project Background

- The token is without any other custom functionality and without any ownership control, which makes it truly decentralized.
- The 6OS token is a standard token smart contract having functions like transfer, approval, etc.

Audit scope

Name	Code Review and Security Analysis Report for 6OS Token Smart Contract
Platform	Ethereum / Solidity
File	6OS.sol
Github commit hash	8e468377b965aedeb8cab8bf9aae524dc954d9a7
Audit Date	August 29th, 2023

Claimed Smart Contract Features

Claimed Feature Detail	Our Observation
Tokenomics: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Name: 6OS Token• Symbol: 6OS• Decimals: 18• Total Supply: 21 Billion• Number of Blocks For Blacklist: 5	YES, This is valid.
Ownership Control: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• There are no owner functions, which makes it 100% decentralized.	YES, This is valid.

Audit Summary

According to the standard audit assessment, Customer`s solidity based smart contracts are **“Secured”**. This token contract does not have any ownership control, hence it is **100% decentralized**.



We used various tools like Slither, Solhint and Remix IDE. At the same time this finding is based on critical analysis of the manual audit.

All issues found during automated analysis were manually reviewed and applicable vulnerabilities are presented in the Audit overview section. General overview is presented in AS-IS section and all identified issues can be found in the Audit overview section.

We found 0 critical, 0 high, 0 medium and 0 low and 5 very low level issues.

Investors Advice: Technical audit of the smart contract does not guarantee the ethical nature of the project. Any owner controlled functions should be executed by the owner with responsibility. All investors/users are advised to do their due diligence before investing in the project.

Technical Quick Stats

Main Category	Subcategory	Result
Contract Programming	Solidity version not specified	Passed
	Solidity version too old	Passed
	Integer overflow/underflow	Passed
	Function input parameters lack of check	Passed
	Function input parameters check bypass	Passed
	Function access control lacks management	Passed
	Critical operation lacks event log	Passed
	Human/contract checks bypass	Passed
	Random number generation/use vulnerability	N/A
	Fallback function misuse	Passed
	Race condition	Passed
	Logical vulnerability	Passed
	Features claimed	Passed
	Other programming issues	Passed
Code Specification	Function visibility not explicitly declared	Passed
	Var. storage location not explicitly declared	Passed
	Use keywords/functions to be deprecated	Passed
	Unused code	Passed
Gas Optimization	"Out of Gas" Issue	Passed
	High consumption 'for/while' loop	Passed
	High consumption 'storage' storage	Passed
	Assert() misuse	Passed
Business Risk	The maximum limit for mintage not set	Passed
	"Short Address" Attack	Passed
	"Double Spend" Attack	Passed

Overall Audit Result: PASSED

Code Quality

This audit scope has 1 smart contract. Smart contract contains Libraries, Smart contracts, inherits and Interfaces. This is a compact and well written smart contract.

The libraries in 6OS Token are part of its logical algorithm. A library is a different type of smart contract that contains reusable code. Once deployed on the blockchain (only once), it is assigned a specific address and its properties / methods can be reused many times by other contracts in the 6OS Token.

The 6OS Token team has **not** provided scenario and unit test scripts, which would have helped to determine the integrity of the code in an automated way.

Code parts are **well** commented on in the smart contracts. Ethereum's NatSpec commenting style is recommended.

Documentation

We were given a 6OS Token smart contract code in the form of a github web link. The hash of that code is mentioned above in the table.

As mentioned above, code parts are **well** commented. And The logic is straightforward. So it is easy to quickly understand the programming flow as well as complex code logic. Comments are very helpful in understanding the overall architecture of the protocol.

Use of Dependencies

As per our observation, the libraries are used in this smart contract infrastructure that are based on well known industry standard open source projects.

Apart from libraries, its functions are not used in external smart contract calls.

AS-IS overview

Functions

Sl.	Functions	Type	Observation	Conclusion
1	constructor	write	Passed	No Issue
2	name	read	Passed	No Issue
3	symbol	read	Passed	No Issue
4	decimals	read	Passed	No Issue
5	totalSupply	read	Passed	No Issue
6	balanceOf	read	Passed	No Issue
7	transfer	write	Passed	No Issue
8	transferFrom	write	Passed	No Issue
9	allowance	read	Passed	No Issue
10	approve	write	Passed	No Issue
11	_approve	internal	Passed	No Issue
12	_spendAllowance	internal	Passed	No Issue
13	_transferTokens	internal	Passed	No Issue
14	setExcludedFromFee	external	Passed	No Issue
15	transfer	internal	Passed	No Issue

Severity Definitions

Risk Level	Description
Critical	Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to token loss etc.
High	High-level vulnerabilities are difficult to exploit; however, they also have significant impact on smart contract execution, e.g. public access to crucial
Medium	Medium-level vulnerabilities are important to fix; however, they can't lead to tokens lose
Low	Low-level vulnerabilities are mostly related to outdated, unused etc. code snippets, that can't have significant impact on execution
Lowest / Code Style / Best Practice	Lowest-level vulnerabilities, code style violations and info statements can't affect smart contract execution and can be ignored.

Audit Findings

Critical Severity

No Critical severity vulnerabilities were found.

High Severity

No High severity vulnerabilities were found.

Medium

No Medium severity vulnerabilities were found.

Low

No Low severity vulnerabilities were found.

Very Low / Informational / Best practices:

(1) No proper usage of `_isExcludedFromFee` variable:

```
194 mapping(address => bool) public blacklisted;
195
196 mapping(address => bool) public _isExcludedFromFee;
197
198 uint256 private currentBlockNumber;
199 uint256 public numBlocksForBlacklist = 5;
200
201 IUniswapV2Router02 public uniswapV2Router;
202 address public _uniswapPair;
203
204
```

The `_isExcludedFromFee` is only used as setter and getter but never used in the logic.

Resolution: Make use of the variable in logic if not required please remove it.

Status: Fixed

(2) Anti-sniper functionality is added:

```
348     function _transfer(address sender, address recipient, uint256 amount) internal {
349         require(sender != address(0), "ERC20: transfer from the zero address");
350         require(recipient != address(0), "ERC20: transfer to the zero address");
351         require(amount > 0, "Transfer amount must be greater than zero");
352         require(!blacklisted[sender], "Sender is blacklisted");
353         require(!blacklisted[recipient], "Recipient is blacklisted");
354
355
356         if(currentBlockNumber == 0 && recipient == _uniswapPair){
357             currentBlockNumber = block.number;
358             _transferTokens(sender, recipient, amount);
359             return;
360         }
361
362         if(block.number <= currentBlockNumber + numBlocksForBlacklist){
363             blacklisted[recipient] = true;
364             return;
365         }
366         _transferTokens(sender, recipient, amount);
367     }
368 }
369 }
```

We observed that the anti-sniper bot functionality is added. We understand it is beneficial. However, any trades happening within 5 blocks after adding liquidity, will be blacklisted. And there is no option to remove it from the blacklist. So, the blacklisting is permanent.

Status: This feature has been acknowledged by the project team, as a required feature.

(3) Unused interface:

```
109 interface IV2Pair {
110     function factory() external view returns (address);
111     function getReserves() external view returns (uint112 reserve0, uint112 reserve1, uint32 blockTimestampLast);
112     function sync() external;
113 }
```

IV2Pair interface is defined but never used.

Resolution: Remove unused interface.

Status: Fixed

(4) Variable should be constant:

```
uint256 private currentBlockNumber;  
uint256 public numBlocksForBlacklist = 5;
```

numBlocksForBlacklist is set once and not changed afterwards.

Resolution: We suggest declaring it as constant will save some gas.

Status: Fixed

(5) Variable should be immutable:

```
IUniswapV2Router02 public uniswapV2Router;  
address public _uniswapPair;
```

The uniswapV2Router and _uniswapPair are set in the constructor only and not changed afterwards.

Resolution: We suggest declaring them as immutable will save some gas.

Status: Fixed

Centralization Risk

The 6OS Token smart contract does not have any ownership control, hence it is 100% decentralized.

Therefore, there is **no** centralization risk.

Conclusion

We were given a contract code in the form of a github web link. And we have used all possible tests based on given objects as files. We had observed 5 informational issues in the smart contracts. And those issues are fixed. So, **it's good to go for the production.**

Since possible test cases can be unlimited for such smart contracts protocol, we provide no such guarantee of future outcomes. We have used all the latest static tools and manual observations to cover maximum possible test cases to scan everything.

Smart contracts within the scope were manually reviewed and analyzed with static analysis tools. Smart Contract's high-level description of functionality was presented in the As-is overview section of the report.

Audit report contains all found security vulnerabilities and other issues in the reviewed code.

Security state of the reviewed smart contract, based on standard audit procedure scope, is **“Secured”**.

Our Methodology

We like to work with a transparent process and make our reviews a collaborative effort. The goals of our security audits are to improve the quality of systems we review and aim for sufficient remediation to help protect users. The following is the methodology we use in our security audit process.

Manual Code Review:

In manually reviewing all of the code, we look for any potential issues with code logic, error handling, protocol and header parsing, cryptographic errors, and random number generators. We also watch for areas where more defensive programming could reduce the risk of future mistakes and speed up future audits. Although our primary focus is on the in-scope code, we examine dependency code and behavior when it is relevant to a particular line of investigation.

Vulnerability Analysis:

Our audit techniques included manual code analysis, user interface interaction, and whitebox penetration testing. We look at the project's web site to get a high level understanding of what functionality the software under review provides. We then meet with the developers to gain an appreciation of their vision of the software. We install and use the relevant software, exploring the user interactions and roles. While we do this, we brainstorm threat models and attack surfaces. We read design documentation, review other audit results, search for similar projects, examine source code dependencies, skim open issue tickets, and generally investigate details other than the implementation.

Documenting Results:

We follow a conservative, transparent process for analyzing potential security vulnerabilities and seeing them through successful remediation. Whenever a potential issue is discovered, we immediately create an Issue entry for it in this document, even though we have not yet verified the feasibility and impact of the issue. This process is conservative because we document our suspicions early even if they are later shown to not represent exploitable vulnerabilities. We generally follow a process of first documenting the suspicion with unresolved questions, then confirming the issue through code analysis, live experimentation, or automated tests. Code analysis is the most tentative, and we strive to provide test code, log captures, or screenshots demonstrating our confirmation. After this we analyze the feasibility of an attack in a live system.

Suggested Solutions:

We search for immediate mitigations that live deployments can take, and finally we suggest the requirements for remediation engineering for future releases. The mitigation and remediation recommendations should be scrutinized by the developers and deployment engineers, and successful mitigation and remediation is an ongoing collaborative process after we deliver our report, and before the details are made public.

Disclaimers

EtherAuthority.io Disclaimer

EtherAuthority team has analyzed this smart contract in accordance with the best industry practices at the date of this report, in relation to: cybersecurity vulnerabilities and issues in smart contract source code, the details of which are disclosed in this report, (Source Code); the Source Code compilation, deployment and functionality (performing the intended functions).


Due to the fact that the total number of test cases are unlimited, the audit makes no statements or warranties on security of the code. It also cannot be considered as a sufficient assessment regarding the utility and safety of the code, bugfree status or any other statements of the contract. While we have done our best in conducting the analysis and producing this report, it is important to note that you should not rely on this report only. We also suggest conducting a bug bounty program to confirm the high level of security of this smart contract.

Technical Disclaimer

Smart contracts are deployed and executed on the blockchain platform. The platform, its programming language, and other software related to the smart contract can have their own vulnerabilities that can lead to hacks. Thus, the audit can't guarantee explicit security of the audited smart contracts.

Appendix

Code Flow Diagram - 6OS Token



Slither Results Log

Slither is a Solidity static analysis framework that uses vulnerability detectors, displays contract details, and provides an API for writing custom analyses. It helps developers identify vulnerabilities, improve code comprehension, and prototype custom analyses quickly. The analysis includes a report with warnings and errors, allowing developers to quickly prototype and fix issues.

We did the analysis of the project altogether. Below are the results.

Slither Log >> 60S.sol

```
Token._transfer(address,address,uint256) (60S.sol#348-368) uses a dangerous strict equality:
- currentBlockNumber == 0 && recipient == _uniswapPair (60S.sol#356)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#dangerous-strict-equalities

Context._msgData() (60S.sol#19-21) is never used and should be removed
Context._msgSender() (60S.sol#15-17) is never used and should be removed
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#dead-code

Pragma version0.8.19 (60S.sol#2) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6/0.8.16
solc-0.8.19 is not recommended for deployment
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity

Token (60S.sol#184-370) should inherit from IERC20 (60S.sol#24-99)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#missing-inheritance

Function IRouter01.WETH() (60S.sol#117) is not in mixedCase
Constant Token._name (60S.sol#186) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
Constant Token._symbol (60S.sol#187) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
Constant Token._decimals (60S.sol#188) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
Variable Token._balances (60S.sol#191) is not in mixedCase
Variable Token._isExcludedFromFee (60S.sol#196) is not in mixedCase
Variable Token._uniswapPair (60S.sol#202) is not in mixedCase
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions

Variable IRouter01.addLiquidity(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint256).amountADesired (60S.sol#129)
is too similar to IRouter01.addLiquidity(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint256).amountBDesired (60S.
sol#130)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#variable-names-too-similar

Token.slitherConstructorVariables() (60S.sol#184-370) uses literals with too many digits:
- _totalSupply = 210000000000 * 10 ** uint256(_decimals) (60S.sol#189)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#too-many-digits

Token._totalSupply (60S.sol#189) should be constant
Token.numBlocksForBlacklist (60S.sol#199) should be constant
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#state-variables-that-could-be-declared-constant

Token._uniswapPair (60S.sol#202) should be immutable
Token.uniswapV2Router (60S.sol#201) should be immutable
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#state-variables-that-could-be-declared-immutable
60S.sol analyzed (7 contracts with 84 detectors), 19 result(s) found
```

Solidity Static Analysis

60S.sol

Check-effects-interaction:

Potential violation of Checks-Effects-Interaction pattern in Token.(): Could potentially lead to re-entrancy vulnerability.

[more](#)

Pos: 223:4:

Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function Token.transfer is infinite: If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)

Pos: 270:4:

Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function Token.transferFrom is infinite: If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)

Pos: 279:4:

Constant/View/Pure functions:

IUniswapV2Router02.swapExactTokensForTokens(uint256,uint256,address[],adc : Potentially should be constant/view/pure but is not.

[more](#)

Pos: 174:4:

Constant/View/Pure functions:

IUniswapV2Router02.swapExactTokensForTokens(uint256,uint256,address[],adc : Potentially should be constant/view/pure but is not.

[more](#)

Pos: 174:4:

No return:

`IRouter01.getAmountsIn(uint256,address[])`: Defines a return type but never explicitly returns a value.

Pos: 150:4:

No return:

`IUniswapV2Router02.swapExactTokensForTokens(uint256,uint256,address[],ad`
Defines a return type but never explicitly returns a value.

Pos: 174:4:

Guard conditions:

Use `"assert(x)"` if you never ever want `x` to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use `"require(x)"` if `x` can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.

[more](#)

Pos: 352:8:

Guard conditions:

Use `"assert(x)"` if you never ever want `x` to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use `"require(x)"` if `x` can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.

[more](#)

Pos: 353:8:

Solhint Linter

6OS.sol

```
Compiler version 0.8.19 does not satisfy the ^0.5.8 semver
requirement
Pos: 1:1
Function name must be in mixedCase
Pos: 5:116
Constant name must be in capitalized SNAKE_CASE
Pos: 5:185
Constant name must be in capitalized SNAKE_CASE
Pos: 5:186
Constant name must be in capitalized SNAKE_CASE
Pos: 5:187
Explicitly mark visibility in function (Set ignoreConstructors to
true if using solidity >=0.7.0)
Pos: 5:222
Error message for require is too long
Pos: 9:301
Error message for require is too long
Pos: 9:302
Error message for require is too long
Pos: 9:330
Error message for require is too long
Pos: 9:348
Error message for require is too long
Pos: 9:349
Error message for require is too long
Pos: 9:350
```

Software analysis result:

These software reported many false positive results and some are informational issues. So, those issues can be safely ignored.



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