

# SMART CONTRACT

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## Security Audit Report

Project: Wrapped ZTX Token  
Platform: Ethereum,  
Binance Smart Chain  
Language: Solidity  
Date: August 16th, 2022

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## Introduction

EtherAuthority was contracted by Wrapped ZTX Token to perform the Security audit of the Wrapped ZTX Token smart contracts code. The audit has been performed using manual analysis as well as using automated software tools. This report presents all the findings regarding the audit performed on August 16th, 2022.

**The purpose of this audit was to address the following:**

- Ensure that all claimed functions exist and function correctly.
- Identify any security vulnerabilities that may be present in the smart contract.

## Project Background

The Wrapped ZTX Contract is an ERC20 token which has functions like mint, pause, unpauses, etc.

## Audit scope


<b>Name</b>	<b>Code Review and Security Analysis Report for Wrapped ZTX Token Smart Contract</b>
<b>Platform</b>	<b>BSC, Ethereum / Solidity</b>
<b>File Ethereum</b>	<a href="#">wZTX.sol</a>
<b>File Ethereum MD5 Hash</b>	7CBC139DA69959344B3CD93BCA5C39BE
<b>Updated File Ethereum MD5 Hash</b>	52B016C9EF1E652327098EDC74713F60
<b>File BSC</b>	<a href="#">bZTX.sol</a>
<b>File BSC MD5 Hash</b>	71CE344663CDE7710C1FFE2EE6358263
<b>Updated File BSC MD5 Hash</b>	9E6001C66D68E7DD271E5BB728D7E506
<b>Audit Date</b>	August 16th,2022
<b>Revise Audit Date</b>	August 22nd,2022

## Claimed Smart Contract Features

Claimed Feature Detail	Our Observation
<b>File Ethereum ZTX.sol</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Name: Wrapped ZTX (Ethereum)</li><li>• Symbol: wZTX</li><li>• Decimals: 18</li><li>• Max Supply: 250 million</li></ul>	<b>YES, This is valid.</b>
<b>File BSC ZTX.sol</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Name: Wrapped ZTX (BSC)</li><li>• Symbol: bZTX</li><li>• Decimals: 18</li><li>• Max Supply: 250 million</li></ul>	<b>YES, This is valid.</b>

# Audit Summary

According to the standard audit assessment, Customer's solidity smart contracts are **"Secured"**. Also, these contracts do contain owner control, which does not make them fully decentralized.



We used various tools like Slither, Solhint and Remix IDE. At the same time this finding is based on critical analysis of the manual audit.

All issues found during automated analysis were manually reviewed and applicable vulnerabilities are presented in the Audit overview section. General overview is presented in AS-IS section and all identified issues can be found in the Audit overview section.

**We found 0 critical, 0 high, 1 medium and 0 low and some very low level issues. All the issues have been resolved / acknowledged in the revised code.**

**Investors Advice:** Technical audit of the smart contract does not guarantee the ethical nature of the project. Any owner controlled functions should be executed by the owner with responsibility. All investors/users are advised to do their due diligence before investing in the project.

## Technical Quick Stats

Main Category	Subcategory	Result
Contract Programming	Solidity version not specified	Passed
	Solidity version too old	Passed
	Integer overflow/underflow	Passed
	Function input parameters lack of check	Passed
	Function input parameters check bypass	Passed
	Function access control lacks management	Passed
	Critical operation lacks event log	Passed
	Human/contract checks bypass	Passed
	Random number generation/use vulnerability	N/A
	Fallback function misuse	Passed
	Race condition	Passed
	Logical vulnerability	Passed
	Features claimed	Passed
	Other programming issues	Passed
Code Specification	Function visibility not explicitly declared	Passed
	Var. storage location not explicitly declared	Passed
	Use keywords/functions to be deprecated	Passed
	Unused code	Passed
Gas Optimization	"Out of Gas" Issue	Passed
	High consumption 'for/while' loop	Passed
	High consumption 'storage' storage	Passed
	Assert() misuse	Passed
Business Risk	The maximum limit for mintage not set	Passed
	"Short Address" Attack	Passed
	"Double Spend" Attack	Passed

Overall Audit Result: **PASSED**

## Code Quality

This audit scope has 1 smart contract file. Smart contract contains Libraries, Smart contracts, inherits and Interfaces. This is a compact and well written smart contract.

The libraries in the Wrapped ZTX Token are part of its logical algorithm. A library is a different type of smart contract that contains reusable code. Once deployed on the blockchain (only once), it is assigned a specific address and its properties / methods can be reused many times by other contracts in the Wrapped ZTX Token.

The Wrapped ZTX team has not provided unit test scripts, which would have helped to determine the integrity of the code in an automated way.

Some code parts are not well commented on smart contracts. We suggest using Ethereum's NatSpec style for the commenting.

## Documentation

We were given a Wrapped ZTX Token smart contract code in the form of a BSCScan web link and Etherscan weblink. The hash of that code is mentioned above in the table.

As mentioned above, code parts are not well commented. But the logic is straightforward. So it is easy to quickly understand the programming flow as well as complex code logic. Comments are very helpful in understanding the overall architecture of the protocol.

## Use of Dependencies

As per our observation, the libraries are used in this smart contracts infrastructure that are based on well known industry standard open source projects.

Apart from libraries, its functions are used in external smart contract calls.



# AS-IS overview

## ZTX.sol

### Functions

Sl.	Functions	Type	Observation	Conclusion
1	constructor	write	Passed	No Issue
2	pause	write	access only Owner	No Issue
3	unpause	write	access only Owner	No Issue
4	mint	write	access only Owner	No Issue
5	_beforeTokenTransfer	internal	Passed	No Issue
6	burn	write	Passed	No Issue
7	burnFrom	write	Passed	No Issue
8	name	read	Passed	No Issue
9	symbol	read	Passed	No Issue
10	decimals	read	Passed	No Issue
11	totalSupply	read	Passed	No Issue
12	balanceOf	read	Passed	No Issue
13	transfer	write	Passed	No Issue
14	allowance	read	Passed	No Issue
15	approve	write	Passed	No Issue
16	transferFrom	write	Passed	No Issue
17	increaseAllowance	write	Passed	No Issue
18	decreaseAllowance	write	Passed	No Issue
19	_transfer	internal	Passed	No Issue
20	_mint	internal	Passed	No Issue
21	_burn	internal	Passed	No Issue
22	_approve	internal	Passed	No Issue
23	_beforeTokenTransfer	internal	Passed	No Issue
24	paused	read	Passed	No Issue
25	whenNotPaused	modifier	Passed	No Issue
26	whenPaused	modifier	Passed	No Issue
27	_pause	internal	Passed	No Issue
28	unpause	internal	Passed	No Issue
29	owner	read	Passed	No Issue
30	onlyOwner	modifier	Passed	No Issue
31	renounceOwnership	write	access only Owner	No Issue
32	transferOwnership	write	access only Owner	No Issue

## Severity Definitions

Risk Level	Description
<b>Critical</b>	Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to token loss etc.
<b>High</b>	High-level vulnerabilities are difficult to exploit; however, they also have significant impact on smart contract execution, e.g. public access to crucial
<b>Medium</b>	Medium-level vulnerabilities are important to fix; however, they can't lead to tokens lose
<b>Low</b>	Low-level vulnerabilities are mostly related to outdated, unused etc. code snippets, that can't have significant impact on execution
<b>Lowest / Code Style / Best Practice</b>	Lowest-level vulnerabilities, code style violations and info statements can't affect smart contract execution and can be ignored.

# Audit Findings

## Critical Severity

No Critical severity vulnerabilities were found.

## High Severity

No High severity vulnerabilities were found.

## Medium

(1) Unlimited minting:

Token minting without any maximum limit is considered inappropriate for tokenomics. We recommend placing some limit on token minting to mitigate this issue.

**Resolution:** We suggest using some token minting limit for better tokenomics.

**Status:** Fixed

## Low

No Low severity vulnerabilities were found.

## Very Low / Informational / Best practices:

(1) SPDX license identifier not provided:

SPDX license identifier not provided in the source code.

**Resolution:** We suggest adding SPDX license identifier.

**Status:** Acknowledged

## Centralization

This smart contract has some functions which can be executed by the Admin (Owner) only. If the admin wallet private key would be compromised, then it would create trouble. Following are Admin functions:

- pause: The owner can trigger a stopped state.
- unpause: The owner can return to normal state.
- mint: The owner can mint tokens.

To make the smart contract 100% decentralized, we suggest renouncing ownership in the smart contract once its function is completed.

## Conclusion

We were given a contract code in the form of a BSCScan web link and Etherscan weblink. And we have used all possible tests based on given objects as files. We have observed 1 medium severity issue and some informational issues in the smart contracts. All the issues have been resolved / acknowledged in the revised code. **So, the smart contracts are ready for the mainnet deployment.**

Since possible test cases can be unlimited for such smart contracts protocol, we provide no such guarantee of future outcomes. We have used all the latest static tools and manual observations to cover maximum possible test cases to scan everything.

Smart contracts within the scope were manually reviewed and analyzed with static analysis tools. Smart Contract's high-level description of functionality was presented in the As-is overview section of the report.

The audit report contains all found security vulnerabilities and other issues in the reviewed code.

The security state of the reviewed contract, based on standard audit procedure scope, is **“Secured”**.

# Our Methodology

We like to work with a transparent process and make our reviews a collaborative effort. The goals of our security audits are to improve the quality of systems we review and aim for sufficient remediation to help protect users. The following is the methodology we use in our security audit process.

## **Manual Code Review:**

In manually reviewing all of the code, we look for any potential issues with code logic, error handling, protocol and header parsing, cryptographic errors, and random number generators. We also watch for areas where more defensive programming could reduce the risk of future mistakes and speed up future audits. Although our primary focus is on the in-scope code, we examine dependency code and behavior when it is relevant to a particular line of investigation.

## **Vulnerability Analysis:**

Our audit techniques included manual code analysis, user interface interaction, and whitebox penetration testing. We look at the project's web site to get a high level understanding of what functionality the software under review provides. We then meet with the developers to gain an appreciation of their vision of the software. We install and use the relevant software, exploring the user interactions and roles. While we do this, we brainstorm threat models and attack surfaces. We read design documentation, review other audit results, search for similar projects, examine source code dependencies, skim open issue tickets, and generally investigate details other than the implementation.

### **Documenting Results:**

We follow a conservative, transparent process for analyzing potential security vulnerabilities and seeing them through successful remediation. Whenever a potential issue is discovered, we immediately create an Issue entry for it in this document, even though we have not yet verified the feasibility and impact of the issue. This process is conservative because we document our suspicions early even if they are later shown to not represent exploitable vulnerabilities. We generally follow a process of first documenting the suspicion with unresolved questions, then confirming the issue through code analysis, live experimentation, or automated tests. Code analysis is the most tentative, and we strive to provide test code, log captures, or screenshots demonstrating our confirmation. After this we analyze the feasibility of an attack in a live system.

### **Suggested Solutions:**

We search for immediate mitigations that live deployments can take, and finally we suggest the requirements for remediation engineering for future releases. The mitigation and remediation recommendations should be scrutinized by the developers and deployment engineers, and successful mitigation and remediation is an ongoing collaborative process after we deliver our report, and before the details are made public.

# Disclaimers

## EtherAuthority.io Disclaimer

EtherAuthority team has analyzed this smart contract in accordance with the best industry practices at the date of this report, in relation to: cybersecurity vulnerabilities and issues in smart contract source code, the details of which are disclosed in this report, (Source Code); the Source Code compilation, deployment and functionality (performing the intended functions).

Due to the fact that the total number of test cases is unlimited, the audit makes no statements or warranties on the security of the code. It also cannot be considered as a sufficient assessment regarding the utility and safety of the code, bugfree status or any other statements of the contract. While we have done our best in conducting the analysis and producing this report, it is important to note that you should not rely on this report only. We also suggest conducting a bug bounty program to confirm the high level of security of this smart contract.

## Technical Disclaimer


Smart contracts are deployed and executed on the blockchain platform. The platform, its programming language, and other software related to the smart contract can have their own vulnerabilities that can lead to hacks. Thus, the audit can't guarantee explicit security of the audited smart contracts.



# Appendix

## Code Flow Diagram - Wrapped ZTX Protocol

### ZTX Diagram



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# Slither Results Log

Slither log >> ZTX.sol

```
INFO:Detectors:
ZTXToken.constructor(string,string)._name (ZTX.sol#573) shadows:
- ERC20._name (ZTX.sol#264) (state variable)
ZTXToken.constructor(string,string)._symbol (ZTX.sol#573) shadows:
- ERC20._symbol (ZTX.sol#265) (state variable)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#local-variable-shadowing
INFO:Detectors:
Context._msgData() (ZTX.sol#26-29) is never used and should be removed
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#dead-code
INFO:Detectors:
Pragma version^0.8.0 (ZTX.sol#9) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Pragma version^0.8.0 (ZTX.sol#534) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
solc-0.8.0 is not recommended for deployment
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity
INFO:Detectors:
Redundant expression "this (ZTX.sol#27)" inContext (ZTX.sol#21-30)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#redundant-statements
INFO:Detectors:
renounceOwnership() should be declared external:
- Ownable.renounceOwnership() (ZTX.sol#67-70)
transferOwnership(address) should be declared external:
- Ownable.transferOwnership(address) (ZTX.sol#76-80)
name() should be declared external:
- ERC20.name() (ZTX.sol#284-286)
symbol() should be declared external:
- ERC20.symbol() (ZTX.sol#292-294)
decimals() should be declared external:
- ERC20.decimals() (ZTX.sol#309-311)
totalSupply() should be declared external:
- ERC20.totalSupply() (ZTX.sol#316-318)
balanceOf(address) should be declared external:
- ERC20.balanceOf(address) (ZTX.sol#323-325)
transfer(address,uint256) should be declared external:
- ERC20.transfer(address,uint256) (ZTX.sol#335-338)
approve(address,uint256) should be declared external:
- ERC20.approve(address,uint256) (ZTX.sol#354-357)
approve(address,uint256) should be declared external:
- ERC20.approve(address,uint256) (ZTX.sol#354-357)
transferFrom(address,address,uint256) should be declared external:
- ERC20.transferFrom(address,address,uint256) (ZTX.sol#372-380)
increaseAllowance(address,uint256) should be declared external:
- ERC20.increaseAllowance(address,uint256) (ZTX.sol#394-397)
decreaseAllowance(address,uint256) should be declared external:
- ERC20.decreaseAllowance(address,uint256) (ZTX.sol#413-419)
burn(uint256) should be declared external:
- ERC20Burnable.burn(uint256) (ZTX.sol#549-551)
burnFrom(address,uint256) should be declared external:
- ERC20Burnable.burnFrom(address,uint256) (ZTX.sol#564-569)
pause() should be declared external:
- ZTXToken.pause() (ZTX.sol#575-577)
unpause() should be declared external:
- ZTXToken.unpause() (ZTX.sol#579-581)
mint(address,uint256) should be declared external:
- ZTXToken.mint(address,uint256) (ZTX.sol#583-585)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#public-function-that-could-be-declared-external
INFO:Slither:ZTX.sol analyzed (7 contracts with 75 detectors), 24 result(s) found
INFO:Slither:Use https://crytic.io/ to get access to additional detectors and Github integration
```

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# Solidity Static Analysis

ZTX.sol

## Gas & Economy

### Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function ERC20.name is infinite: If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)

Pos: 333:4:

### Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function ZTXToken.unpause is infinite: If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)

Pos: 637:4:

### Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function ZTXToken.mint is infinite: If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)

Pos: 641:4:

## Miscellaneous

### Constant/View/Pure functions:

ZTXToken.\_beforeTokenTransfer(address,address,uint256) : Potentially should be constant/view/pure but is not. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.

[more](#)

Pos: 645:4:

### Similar variable names:

ERC20Burnable.burnFrom(address,uint256) : Variables have very similar names "account" and "amount". Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.

Pos: 617:14:

### Similar variable names:

ERC20Burnable.burnFrom(address,uint256) : Variables have very similar names "account" and "amount". Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.

Pos: 617:23:

### No return:

IERC20.transferFrom(address,address,uint256): Defines a return type but never explicitly returns a value.

Pos: 257:4:

### Guard conditions:

Use "assert(x)" if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use "require(x)" if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.

[more](#)

Pos: 556:8:

### Guard conditions:

Use "assert(x)" if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use "require(x)" if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.

[more](#)

Pos: 615:8:

# Solhint Linter

## ZTX.sol

```
ZTX.sol:9:1: Error: Compiler version ^0.8.0 does not satisfy the r
semver requirement
ZTX.sol:36:1: Error: Compiler version ^0.8.0 does not satisfy the r
semver requirement
ZTX.sol:58:5: Error: Explicitly mark visibility in function (Set
ignoreConstructors to true if using solidity >=0.7.0)
ZTX.sol:106:1: Error: Compiler version ^0.8.0 does not satisfy the r
semver requirement
ZTX.sol:134:5: Error: Explicitly mark visibility in function (Set
ignoreConstructors to true if using solidity >=0.7.0)
ZTX.sol:198:1: Error: Compiler version ^0.8.0 does not satisfy the r
semver requirement
ZTX.sol:278:1: Error: Compiler version ^0.8.0 does not satisfy the r
semver requirement
ZTX.sol:325:5: Error: Explicitly mark visibility in function (Set
ignoreConstructors to true if using solidity >=0.7.0)
ZTX.sol:576:94: Error: Code contains empty blocks
ZTX.sol:583:1: Error: Compiler version ^0.8.0 does not satisfy the r
semver requirement
ZTX.sol:624:1: Error: Compiler version ^0.8.4 does not satisfy the r
semver requirement
ZTX.sol:631:5: Error: Explicitly mark visibility in function (Set
ignoreConstructors to true if using solidity >=0.7.0)
ZTX.sol:631:83: Error: Code contains empty blocks
```

### Software analysis result:

These software reported many false positive results and some are informational issues. So, those issues can be safely ignored.



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