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SMART CONTRACT

Security Audit Report

Project: TheIronMan Finance

Website: theironman.finance

Platform: Core Chain

Language: Solidity

Date: March 13th, 2023

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Introduction

EtherAuthority was contracted by TheIronMan Finance to perform the Security audit of the TheIronMan Finance Protocol smart contracts code. The audit has been performed using manual analysis as well as using automated software tools. This report presents all the findings regarding the audit performed on March 13th, 2023.

The purpose of this audit was to address the following:

- Ensure that all claimed functions exist and function correctly.
- Identify any security vulnerabilities that may be present in the smart contract.

Project Background

- TheIronMan Finance is a project that aims to create a synthetic protocol and support a synthetic asset market.
- TheIronMan Finance uses a Collateral Ratio (CR) for minting and redeeming TheIronMan's synths. There will be a minimum CR set by governance for respective synths. The CR is used by the minting and redeeming functions. It is displayed as a percentage. The ratio shows what percentage of IMT is needed in order to mint or redeem a CORE token.
- In the case of COREX trading above the value of CORE, a user can mint the synth token through the protocol, using the value of 1 CORE token for 1 synth token, and then sell the synth token on the open market. Over a short time period the profitable arb opportunity will subside—the prices will converge.
- TheIronMan Finance contract inherits the ERC20, SafeERC20, Context, Ownable, ReentrancyGuard, Address, IERC20, Math, SafeMath, Initializable standard smart contracts from the OpenZeppelin library.
- TheIronMan Finance contract inherits the IUniswapV2Pair, IUniswapV2Router02 standard smart contracts from the uniswap library.
- These OpenZeppelin and uniswap contracts are considered community-audited and time-tested, and hence are not part of the audit scope.

Audit scope

| Name | Code Review and Security Analysis Report for ThelronMan Finance Protocol Smart Contracts | | |
|------------------|--|--|--|
| Platform | Core Chain / Solidity | | |
| File 1 | Pool.sol | | |
| File 1 MD5 Hash | 5A2A00BB08B8E6D864762B7923234D83 | | |
| File 2 | SwapStrategyPOL.sol | | |
| File 2 MD5 Hash | 3AE7E63D48701C411ABB283789C1437F | | |
| File 3 | StratReduceReserveLP.sol | | |
| File 3 MD5 Hash | 16E6A30B5CAEDE87A5F4A5BFF827D22F | | |
| File 4 | DaoChef.sol | | |
| File 4 MD5 Hash | E12C4E0BDCB405DD0DB61CCF7173ED06 | | |
| File 5 | DaoStaking.sol | | |
| File 5 MD5 Hash | 420E6CBD2A617CF1A889C9FB3748A035 | | |
| File 6 | DaoZapMMSwap.sol | | |
| File 6 MD5 Hash | 8C94DD4015FAD718D7A77F614090C88E | | |
| File 7 | NFTController.sol | | |
| File 7 MD5 Hash | 7B517FFAE5E28C8D3B7020747FFA8659 | | |
| File 8 | DevFund.sol | | |
| File 8 MD5 Hash | E8F0D50D10EA81F373B23544A020892B | | |
| File 9 | EcosystemFund.sol | | |
| File 9 MD5 Hash | 252B8F6FCBABD3E4A205363E4245D000 | | |
| File 10 | Fund.sol | | |
| File 10 MD5 Hash | 47370A0301A3BBA40747C7FFD8A18E6B | | |
| File 11 | Reserve.sol | | |
| File 11 MD5 Hash | FEF578E09DAA9039E6B42E44190E2245 | | |
| File 12 | MasterOracle.sol | | |

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| File 12 MD5 Hash | 26FFB8A6EB84AABF384A830DB4572C0A |
|------------------|----------------------------------|
| File 13 | UniswapPairOracle.sol |
| File 13 MD5 Hash | 37801A23DE6F4571ADD278A4A062C1D5 |
| File 14 | XToken.sol |
| File 14 MD5 Hash | 83382FC411F2E4462B30C55D6F62A2DD |
| File 15 | YToken.sol |
| File 15 MD5 Hash | FFA9BDAB9AEE9D07DB46CB3A23A34696 |
| File 16 | IMT.sol |
| File 16 MD5 Hash | 1B73A648455049564C87A16513A14E13 |
| File 17 | COREX.sol |
| File 17 MD5 Hash | 1A564457EF100782F814814C3BAEA787 |
| File 18 | DaoTreasury.sol |
| File 18 MD5 Hash | 0B9AE0B9E415F68B36F7B1047E21B02C |
| File 19 | StratRecollateralize.sol |
| File 19 MD5 Hash | C02B3F40E26D074FB153BAC73AD35F92 |
| Audit Date | March 13th,2023 |

Claimed Smart Contract Features

| Claimed Feature Detail | Our Observation |
|---|--------------------------|
| File 1 Pool.sol | YES, This is valid. |
| Refresh Cooldown: 1 hour | Owner authorized wallet |
| Ratio StepUp: 0.2% | can set some percentage |
| Ratio StepDown: 0.2% | value and we suggest |
| Price Target: 1 | handling the private key |
| Price Band: 0.004 (CR will be adjusted if XToken > | of that wallet securely. |
| 1.004 MUSD or if XToken < 0.996 MUSD) | |
| Min Collateral Ratio: 95% | |
| yTokenSlippage: 20% | |
| Redemption Fee: 10% | |
| Redemption Fee Maximum: 0.9% | |
| Minting Fee: 0.5% | |
| Minting Fee Maximum:0.5% | |
| File 2 SwapStrategyPOL.sol | YES, This is valid. |
| Swap Slippage: 20% | Owner authorized wallet |
| Swapper: Protocol Owned Liquidity can execute | can set some percentage |
| functionality like: | value and we suggest |
| Add liquidity for YToken/WETH LP. | handling the private key |
| Transfer LP to Treasury. | of that wallet securely. |
| ○ Swap 50% of WETH to YToken. | |
| File 3 DaoChef.sol | |
| Maximum Reward: 10 token per second. | YES, This is valid. |
| A new LP can be added to the pool by the owner. | |
| A pool's reward allocation point and IRewarder | |
| contract can be updated by the owner. | |
| File 4 DaoStaking.sol | YES, This is valid. |
| DaoStaking is based on EPS's & Geist's multi fee | |
| distribution. | |

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
| Grouped Duration: 1 day | |
|---|---------------------|
| Rewards Duration: 1 week | |
| Lock Duration: 4 weeks | |
| Team Rewards: 20% | |
| File 5 DaoZapMMSwap.sol | YES, This is valid. |
| DaoZap is a ZapperFi's simplified version of zapper | |
| contract which will: | |
| 1. use ETH to swap to target token | |
| 2. make LP between ETH and target token | |
| 3. add into DaoChef farm | |
| File 6 NFTController.sol | YES, This is valid. |
| Default Boost Rate: 1% | |
| File 7 Fund.sol | YES, This is valid. |
| Owner can transfer amounts. | |
| File 8 DevFund.sol | YES, This is valid. |
| Allocation: 5% | |
| Vesting Duration: 2 Years | |
| File 9 Reserve.sol | YES, This is valid. |
| Owner can set the pool address. | |
| Owner can remove the pool address. | |
| File 10 EcosystemFund.sol | YES, This is valid. |
| Allocation: 15% | |
| Vesting Duration: 2 Years | |
| File 11 MasterOracle.sol | YES, This is valid. |
| MasterOracle has functions like: getXTokenPrice, | |
| getYTokenPrice, getYTokenTWAP, etc. | |
| File 12 UniswapPairOracle.sol | YES, This is valid. |
| Period: 60-minute TWAP (Time-Weighted Average | |

| | T |
|---|---------------------|
| Price) | |
| Maximum Period: 48 Hours | |
| Minimum Period: 10 Minutes | |
| Leniency: 12 Hours | |
| File 13 XToken.sol | YES, This is valid. |
| Owner can set the minter address for XToken(only) | |
| once). | |
| Owner can remove the minter address from | |
| XToken. | |
| Owner can mint a new XToken. | |
| File 14 YToken.sol | YES, This is valid. |
| The YToken contract inherits the ERC20Burnable | |
| standard smart contracts from the OpenZeppelin | |
| library. | |
| File 15 IMT.sol | YES, This is valid. |
| Decimals: 18 | |
| Total Supply: 5 Million | |
| Owner can set openTrading's true status. | |
| File 16 COREX.sol | |
| 100 will be minted at genesis for liquid pool | YES, This is valid. |
| seeding. | |
| File 17 DaoTreasury.sol | YES, This is valid. |
| DaoTreasury is to store the reserve of TheIronMan | |
| Protocol. | |
| These contracts will have a whitelist of strategy | |
| contracts which can request funding from Reserve. | |
| These strategy contracts can be used to Allocate | |
| fee, Convert reserve to Protocol Owned Liquidity, | |
| Recollateralize, etc. | |
| File 18 StratRecollateralize.sol | YES, This is valid. |

| Owner can recollateralize the minting pool. | |
|---|---------------------|
| File 19 StratReduceReserveLP.sol | YES, This is valid. |
| Owner can remove liquidity, buy back YToken and | |
| burn. | |

Audit Summary

According to the standard audit assessment, Customer's solidity smart contracts are "Secured". Also, these contracts do contain owner control, which does not make them fully decentralized.



We used various tools like Slither, Solhint and Remix IDE. At the same time this finding is based on critical analysis of the manual audit.

All issues found during automated analysis were manually reviewed and applicable vulnerabilities are presented in the Audit overview section. General overview is presented in AS-IS section and all identified issues can be found in the Audit overview section.

We found 0 critical, 0 high, 0 medium and 2 low and some very low level issues.

Investors Advice: Technical audit of the smart contract does not guarantee the ethical nature of the project. Any owner controlled functions should be executed by the owner with responsibility. All investors/users are advised to do their due diligence before investing in the project.

Technical Quick Stats

| Main Category | Main Category Subcategory | |
|---|---|-----------|
| Contract Solidity version not specified | | Passed |
| Programming | Solidity version too old | Passed |
| | Integer overflow/underflow | Passed |
| | Function input parameters lack of check | Moderated |
| | Function input parameters check bypass | Passed |
| | Function access control lacks management | Passed |
| | Critical operation lacks event log | Moderated |
| | Human/contract checks bypass | Passed |
| | Random number generation/use vulnerability | N/A |
| | Fallback function misuse | Passed |
| | Race condition | Passed |
| | Logical vulnerability | Passed |
| | Features claimed | Passed |
| | Other programming issues | |
| Code | Function visibility not explicitly declared | Passed |
| Specification | Var. storage location not explicitly declared | Passed |
| | Use keywords/functions to be deprecated | Passed |
| | Unused code | Passed |
| Gas Optimization | "Out of Gas" Issue | Passed |
| | High consumption 'for/while' loop | Moderated |
| High consumption 'storage' storage | | Passed |
| | Assert() misuse | Passed |
| Business Risk | Business Risk The maximum limit for mintage not set | |
| | "Short Address" Attack | Passed |
| | "Double Spend" Attack | Passed |

Overall Audit Result: PASSED

Code Quality

This audit scope has 19 smart contract files. Smart contracts contain Libraries, Smart

contracts, inherits and Interfaces. This is a compact and well written smart contract.

The libraries in the TheIronMan Finance Protocol are part of its logical algorithm. A library

is a different type of smart contract that contains reusable code. Once deployed on the

blockchain (only once), it is assigned a specific address and its properties / methods can

be reused many times by other contracts in the TheIronMan Finance Protocol.

The TheIronMan Finance team has not provided unit test scripts, which would have helped

to determine the integrity of the code in an automated way.

Code parts are well commented on smart contracts.

Documentation

We were given a ThelronMan Finance Protocol smart contract code in the form of a file.

The hash of that code is mentioned above in the table.

As mentioned above, code parts are **well** commented. So it is easy to quickly understand

the programming flow as well as complex code logic. Comments are very helpful in

understanding the overall architecture of the protocol.

Another source of information was its official website: https://theironman.finance which

provided rich information about the project architecture and tokenomics.

Use of Dependencies

As per our observation, the libraries are used in this smart contracts infrastructure that are

based on well known industry standard open source projects.

Apart from libraries, its functions are used in external smart contract calls.

AS-IS overview

Pool.sol

Functions

| SI. | Functions | Type | Observation | Conclusion |
|-----|---------------------------|----------|-------------------|------------|
| 1 | constructor | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 2 | owner | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 3 | onlyOwner | modifier | Passed | No Issue |
| 4 | renounceOwnership | write | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 5 | _checkOwner | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 6 | transferOwnership | write | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 7 | _transferOwnership | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 8 | nonReentrant | modifier | Passed | No Issue |
| 9 | _nonReentrantBefore | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 10 | _nonReentrantAfter | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 11 | _reentrancyGuardEntered | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 12 | info | external | Passed | No Issue |
| 13 | usableCollateralBalance | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 14 | calcMint | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 15 | calcRedeem | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 16 | calcExcessCollateralBalan | read | Passed | No Issue |
| | ce | | | |
| 17 | refreshCollateralRatio | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 18 | mint | external | Passed | No Issue |
| 19 | redeem | external | Passed | No Issue |
| 20 | collect | external | Passed | No Issue |
| 21 | recollateralize | external | Passed | No Issue |
| 22 | checkPriceFluctuation | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 23 | toggle | write | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 24 | setCollateralRatioOptions | write | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 25 | toggleCollateralRatio | write | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 26 | setFees | write | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 27 | setMinCollateralRatio | external | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 28 | reduceExcessCollateral | external | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 29 | setSwapStrategy | external | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 30 | setOracle | external | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 31 | setYTokenSlippage | external | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 32 | setTreasury | external | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 33 | transferToTreasury | internal | Passed | No Issue |

SwapStrategyPOL.sol

Functions

| SI. | Functions | Type | Observation | Conclusion |
|-----|-----------------------|----------|-------------------|------------|
| 1 | constructor | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 2 | owner | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 3 | onlyOwner | modifier | Passed | No Issue |
| 4 | renounceOwnership | write | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 5 | checkOwner | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 6 | transferOwnership | write | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 7 | _transferOwnership | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 8 | IpBalance | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 9 | execute | external | Passed | No Issue |
| 10 | swap | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 11 | addLiquidity | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 12 | cleanDust | external | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 13 | changeSlippage | external | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 14 | calculateSwapInAmount | internal | Passed | No Issue |

DaoChef.sol

Functions

| SI. | Functions | Туре | Observation | Conclusion |
|-----|--------------------|----------|-------------------|-------------|
| 1 | constructor | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 2 | owner | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 3 | onlyOwner | modifier | Passed | No Issue |
| 4 | renounceOwnership | write | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 5 | _checkOwner | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 6 | transferOwnership | write | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 7 | _transferOwnership | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 8 | poolLength | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 9 | pendingReward | external | Passed | No Issue |
| 10 | updatePool | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 11 | massUpdatePools | write | Infinite loop | Refer Audit |
| | | | | Findings |
| 12 | deposit | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 13 | withdraw | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 14 | harvest | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 15 | withdrawAndHarvest | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 16 | emergencyWithdraw | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 17 | harvestAllRewards | external | Infinite loop | Refer Audit |
| | | | | Findings |
| 18 | checkPoolDuplicate | internal | Infinite loop | Refer Audit |
| | | | | Findings |
| 19 | add | write | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 20 | set | write | access only Owner | No Issue |

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| 21 | setRewardPerSecond | write | access only Owner | No Issue |
|----|--------------------|----------|---|-------------------------|
| 22 | setRewardMinter | external | Passed | No Issue |
| 23 | getBoost | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 24 | getSlots | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 25 | getTokenIds | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 26 | depositNFT | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 27 | withdrawNFT | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 28 | setNftController | write | Function input parameters lack of check | Refer Audit Findings |
| 29 | setNftBoostRate | write | access only Owner | No Issue |

DaoStaking.sol

Functions

| SI. | Functions | Type | Observation | Conclusion |
|-----|--------------------------|----------|--------------------|-------------|
| 1 | constructor | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 2 | owner | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 3 | onlyOwner | modifier | Passed | No Issue |
| 4 | renounceOwnership | write | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 5 | _checkOwner | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 6 | transferOwnership | write | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 7 | _transferOwnership | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 8 | nonReentrant | modifier | Passed | No Issue |
| 9 | _nonReentrantBefore | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 10 | nonReentrantAfter | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 11 | _reentrancyGuardEntered | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 12 | addReward | write | Function input | Refer Audit |
| | | | parameters lack of | Findings |
| | | | check | |
| 13 | approveRewardDistributor | external | Function input | Refer Audit |
| | | | parameters lack of | Findings |
| | | | check | |
| 14 | _rewardPerToken | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 15 | _earned | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 16 | lastTimeRewardApplicable | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 17 | rewardPerToken | external | Passed | No Issue |
| 18 | getRewardForDuration | external | Passed | No Issue |
| 19 | claimableRewards | external | Passed | No Issue |
| 20 | totalBalance | external | Passed | No Issue |
| 21 | unlockedBalance | external | Passed | No Issue |
| 22 | earnedBalances | external | Passed | No Issue |
| 23 | lockedBalances | external | Passed | No Issue |
| 24 | withdrawableBalance | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 25 | stake | external | Passed | No Issue |

| 26 | mint | external | Function input | Refer Audit |
|----|----------------------|----------|--------------------|-------------|
| | | | parameters lack of | Findings |
| | | | check | |
| 27 | withdraw | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 28 | getReward | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 29 | emergencyWithdraw | external | Critical operation | Refer Audit |
| | | | lacks event log | Findings |
| 30 | withdrawExpiredLocks | external | Passed | No Issue |
| 31 | notifyReward | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 32 | notifyRewardAmount | external | Function input | Refer Audit |
| | | | parameters lack of | Findings |
| | | | check | |
| 33 | recoverERC20 | external | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 34 | updateReward | modifier | Passed | No Issue |
| 35 | receive | external | Passed | No Issue |
| 36 | setTeamWalletAddress | external | Passed | No Issue |
| 37 | setTeamRewardPercent | external | Passed | No Issue |

DaoZapMMSwap.sol

Functions

| SI. | Functions | Туре | Observation | Conclusion |
|-----|-------------------------|----------|-------------------|------------|
| 1 | constructor | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 2 | owner | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 3 | onlyOwner | modifier | Passed | No Issue |
| 4 | renounceOwnership | write | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 5 | _checkOwner | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 6 | transferOwnership | write | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 7 | _transferOwnership | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 8 | nonReentrant | modifier | Passed | No Issue |
| 9 | _nonReentrantBefore | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 10 | _nonReentrantAfter | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 11 | _reentrancyGuardEntered | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 12 | zap | external | Passed | No Issue |
| 13 | receive | external | Passed | No Issue |
| 14 | swap | internal | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 15 | doSwapETH | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 16 | approveToken | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 17 | calculateSwapInAmount | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 18 | addZap | external | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 19 | removeZap | external | access only Owner | No Issue |

NFTController.sol

Functions

| SI. | Functions | Туре | Observation | Conclusion |
|-----|------------------------|----------|-------------------|------------|
| 1 | constructor | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 2 | owner | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 3 | onlyOwner | modifier | Passed | No Issue |
| 4 | renounceOwnership | write | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 5 | checkOwner | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 6 | transferOwnership | write | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 7 | _transferOwnership | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 8 | initialize | write | initializer | No Issue |
| 9 | initializer | modifier | Passed | No Issue |
| 10 | reinitializer | modifier | Passed | No Issue |
| 11 | onlyInitializing | modifier | Passed | No Issue |
| 12 | disableInitializers | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 13 | _getInitializedVersion | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 14 | isInitializing | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 15 | getBoostRate | external | Passed | No Issue |
| 16 | setWhitelist | external | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 17 | setDefaultBoostRate | external | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 18 | setBoostRate | external | access only Owner | No Issue |

Fund.sol

Functions

| SI. | Functions | Туре | Observation | Conclusion |
|-----|------------------------|----------|-------------------|------------|
| 1 | constructor | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 2 | owner | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 3 | onlyOwner | modifier | Passed | No Issue |
| 4 | renounceOwnership | write | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 5 | _checkOwner | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 6 | transferOwnership | write | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 7 | _transferOwnership | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 8 | nonReentrant | modifier | Passed | No Issue |
| 9 | _nonReentrantBefore | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 10 | _nonReentrantAfter | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 11 | reentrancyGuardEntered | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 12 | initialize | external | initializer | No Issue |
| 13 | allocation | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 14 | vestingStart | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 15 | vestingDuration | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 16 | currentBalance | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 17 | vestedBalance | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 18 | claimable | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 19 | transfer | external | access only Owner | No Issue |

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DevFund.sol

Functions

| SI. | Functions | Туре | Observation | Conclusion |
|-----|-----------------|----------|-------------------|------------|
| 1 | constructor | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 2 | initialize | external | Passed | No Issue |
| 3 | allocation | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 4 | vestingStart | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 5 | vestingDuration | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 6 | currentBalance | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 7 | vestedBalance | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 8 | claimable | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 9 | transfer | external | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 10 | allocation | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 11 | vestingStart | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 12 | vestingDuration | write | Passed | No Issue |

Reserve.sol

Functions

| SI. | Functions | Туре | Observation | Conclusion |
|-----|------------------------|----------|-------------------|------------|
| 1 | constructor | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 2 | initializer | modifier | Passed | No Issue |
| 3 | setRewarder | external | Passed | No Issue |
| 4 | setPool | external | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 5 | removePool | external | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 6 | transfer | external | Passed | No Issue |
| 7 | nonReentrant | modifier | Passed | No Issue |
| 8 | _nonReentrantBefore | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 9 | _nonReentrantAfter | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 10 | reentrancyGuardEntered | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 11 | owner | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 12 | onlyOwner | modifier | Passed | No Issue |
| 13 | renounceOwnership | write | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 14 | _checkOwner | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 15 | transferOwnership | write | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 16 | _transferOwnership | internal | Passed | No Issue |

EcosystemFund.sol

Functions

| SI. | Functions | Type | Observation | Conclusion |
|-----|-------------|----------|-------------|------------|
| 1 | constructor | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 2 | initialize | external | Passed | No Issue |
| 3 | allocation | read | Passed | No Issue |

| 4 | vestingStart | read | Passed | No Issue |
|----|-----------------|----------|-------------------|----------|
| 5 | vestingDuration | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 6 | currentBalance | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 7 | vestedBalance | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 8 | claimable | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 9 | transfer | external | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 10 | allocation | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 11 | vestingStart | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 12 | vestingDuration | write | Passed | No Issue |

MasterOracle.sol

Functions

| SI. | Functions | Туре | Observation | Conclusion |
|-----|--------------------|----------|-------------------|------------|
| 1 | constructor | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 2 | owner | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 3 | onlyOwner | modifier | Passed | No Issue |
| 4 | renounceOwnership | write | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 5 | _checkOwner | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 6 | transferOwnership | write | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 7 | _transferOwnership | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 8 | getXTokenPrice | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 9 | getYTokenPrice | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 10 | getXTokenTWAP | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 11 | getYTokenTWAP | read | Passed | No Issue |

UniswapPairOracle.sol

Functions

| SI. | Functions | Туре | Observation | Conclusion |
|-----|-------------------------|----------|-------------------|------------|
| 1 | constructor | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 2 | setPeriod | external | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 3 | update | external | Passed | No Issue |
| 4 | twap | external | Passed | No Issue |
| 5 | spot | external | Passed | No Issue |
| 6 | currentBlockTimestamp | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 7 | currentCumulativePrices | internal | Passed | No Issue |

XToken.sol

Functions

| SI. | Functions | Type | Observation | Conclusion |
|-----|-------------|----------|-------------------|------------|
| 1 | constructor | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 2 | onlyMinter | modifier | Passed | No Issue |
| 3 | setMinter | external | access only Owner | No Issue |

| 4 | removeMinter | external | access only Owner | No Issue |
|---|--------------|----------|--------------------|----------|
| 5 | mint | external | access only Minter | No Issue |
| 6 | burn | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 7 | burnFrom | write | Passed | No Issue |

YToken.sol

Functions

| SI. | Functions | Type | Observation | Conclusion |
|-----|-------------|-------|-------------|------------|
| 1 | constructor | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 2 | burn | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 3 | burnFrom | write | Passed | No Issue |

IMT.sol

Functions

| SI. | Functions | Type | Observation | Conclusion |
|-----|---------------------|----------|-------------|------------|
| 1 | constructor | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 2 | OpenTrade | external | Passed | No Issue |
| 3 | includeToWhitelist | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 4 | excludeFromWhitlist | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 5 | _transfer | write | Passed | No Issue |

COREX.sol

Functions

| SI. | Functions | Type | Observation | Conclusion |
|-----|---------------------|----------|-------------|------------|
| 1 | constructor | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 2 | OpenTrade | external | Passed | No Issue |
| 3 | includeToWhitelist | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 4 | excludeFromWhitlist | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 5 | _transfer | internal | Passed | No Issue |

StratRecollateralize.sol

Functions

| SI. | Functions | Туре | Observation | Conclusion |
|-----|-------------------|----------|-------------------|------------|
| 1 | constructor | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 2 | recollateralize | external | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 3 | receive | external | Passed | No Issue |
| 4 | owner | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 5 | onlyOwner | modifier | Passed | No Issue |
| 6 | renounceOwnership | write | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 7 | _checkOwner | internal | Passed | No Issue |

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Email: audit@EtherAuthority.io

| 8 | transferOwnership | write | access only Owner | No Issue |
|---|--------------------|----------|-------------------|----------|
| 9 | _transferOwnership | internal | Passed | No Issue |

StratReduceReserveLP.sol

Functions

| SI. | Functions | Type | Observation | Conclusion |
|-----|--------------------|----------|-------------------|------------|
| 1 | constructor | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 2 | owner | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 3 | onlyOwner | modifier | Passed | No Issue |
| 4 | renounceOwnership | write | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 5 | _checkOwner | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 6 | transferOwnership | write | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 7 | _transferOwnership | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 8 | reduceReserve | external | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 9 | swap | internal | Passed | No Issue |

DaoTreasury.sol

Functions

| SI. | Functions | Type | Observation | Conclusion |
|-----|--------------------|----------|-------------------|------------|
| 1 | constructor | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 2 | owner | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 3 | onlyOwner | modifier | Passed | No Issue |
| 4 | renounceOwnership | write | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 5 | _checkOwner | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 6 | transferOwnership | write | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 7 | _transferOwnership | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 8 | balanceOf | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 9 | requestFund | external | Passed | No Issue |
| 10 | addStrategy | external | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 11 | removeStrategy | external | access only Owner | No Issue |
| 12 | allocateFee | external | access only Owner | No Issue |

Severity Definitions

| Risk Level | Description |
|---|---|
| Critical | Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to token loss etc. |
| High-level vulnerabilities are difficult to exploit; however they also have significant impact on smart contract execution, e.g. public access to crucial | |
| Medium Medium-level vulnerabilities are important to fix; however, they can't lead to tokens lose | |
| Low-level vulnerabilities are mostly related to outdated, unused etc. code snippets, that can't have significant impact on execution | |
| Lowest / Code Style / Best Practice | Lowest-level vulnerabilities, code style violations and info statements can't affect smart contract execution and can be ignored. |

Audit Findings

Critical Severity

No Critical severity vulnerabilities were found.

High Severity

No High severity vulnerabilities were found.

Medium

No Medium severity vulnerabilities were found.

Low

(1) Function input parameters lack of check:

Variable validation is not performed in below functions:

DaoChef.sol

• setNftController = controller

DaoStaking.sol

- addReward = rewardsToken
- approveRewardDistributor = _rewardsToken ,_distributor
- mint = user
- notifyRewardAmount = _rewardsToken

Resolution: We advise to put validation: integer type variables should be greater than 0 and address type variables should not be address(0).

(2) Critical operation lacks event log: **DaoStaking.sol**Missing event log for:

emergencyWithdraw

Resolution: Write an event log for listed events.

Very Low / Informational / Best practices:

(1) Infinite loop: DaoChef.sol

In harvestAllRewards,checkPoolDuplicate ,massUpdatePools functions for loop does not have an upper length limit , which costs more gas.

Resolution: Upper bound should have a certain limit for loops.

(2) Division before multiplication: DaoStaking.sol

Solidity being resource constraint language, dividing any amount and then multiplying will cause discrepancy in the outcome. Therefore always multiply the amount first and then divide it.

Resolution: Consider ordering multiplication before division.

(3) Owner can drain all ERC20 tokens: DaoStaking.sol

The function recoverERC20() will allow the owner to withdraw all the ERC20 tokens. This would create trust issues in the users.

Resolution: If these are desired features, then please ignore this point.

(4) Hardcoded Wrapped Token: WethUtils.sol

```
library WethUtils {
   using SafeERC20 for IWETH;
   using SafeERC20 for IERC20;

IWETH public constant weth = IWETH(0xc86c7C0eFbd6A49B35E8714C5f59D99De09A225b); // WCORE
```

In WethUtils.sol file, weth public constant variable has a hardcoded token address which is of KAVA network.

Resolution: We suggest changing wrapped token addresses before deploying contracts.

Centralization

This smart contract has some functions which can be executed by the Admin (Owner) only. If the admin wallet private key would be compromised, then it would create trouble. Following are Admin functions:

Pool.sol

- toggle: Owner can turn on / off minting and redemption.
- setCollateralRatioOptions: Owner can configure variables related to Collateral Ratio.
- toggleCollateralRatio: Owner can pause or unpause collateral ratio updates.
- setFees: Owner can set the protocol fees.
- setMinCollateralRatio: Owner can set the minimum Collateral Ratio.
- reduceExcessCollateral: Owner can transfer the excess balance of WETH to FeeReserve.
- setSwapStrategy: Owner can set the address of Swapper utils.
- setOracle: Owner can set new oracle address.
- setYTokenSlippage: Owner can set yTokenSlipage.

SwapStrategyPOL.sol

- cleanDust: Owner can clean dust.
- changeSlippage: Owner can change slippage value.

DaoChef.sol

- add: Owner can add a new LP to the pool.
- set: Owner can update the given pool's reward allocation point and `IRewarder` contract
- setRewardPerSecond: Owner can set the reward per second to be distributed.
- setRewardMinter: Owner can set the address of rewardMinter.
- depositNFT: Owner can check if User does not have the specified NFT.
- setNftController: Owner can set Nft Controller address.
- setNftBoostRate: Owner can set Nft Boost Rate.

DaoStaking.sol

- addReward: Owner can add a new reward token to be distributed to stakers.
- approveRewardDistributor: Owner can modify approval for an address to call notifyRewardAmount.
- recoverERC20: Owner can be added to support recovering LP Rewards from other systems such as BAL to be distributed to holders.
- setTeamWalletAddress: Owner can set team wallet address.
- setTeamRewardPercent: Owner can set team reward percentage.

DaoZapMMSwap.sol

- addZap: Owner can add new zap configuration.
- removeZap: Owner can Deactivate a Zap configuration.

NFTController.sol

- setWhitelist: Owner can set whitelist addresses.
- setDefaultBoostRate: Owner can set default BoostRate value 1%.
- setBoostRate: Owner can set BoostRate value 1%.

Fund.sol

• transfer: Owner can transfer amounts.

Reserve.sol

- setPool: Owner can set pool address.
- removePool: Owner can remove pool address.

UniswapPairOracle.sol

setPeriod: Owner can set the period.

XToken.sol

- setMinter: Owner can set minter address for XToken.
- removeMinter: Owner can remove minter address from XToken.

IMT.sol

OpenTrade: Owner can set openTrading true status.

- includeToWhitelist: Owner can include address to Whitelist.
- excludeFromWhitlist: Owner can exclude address from Whitelist.

COREX.sol

- OpenTrade: Owner can set openTrading true status.
- includeToWhitelist: Owner can include address to Whitelist.
- excludeFromWhitlist: Owner can exclude address from Whitelist.

DaoTreasury.sol

- addStrategy: Owner can add new strategy.
- removeStrategy: Owner can remove the current strategy.
- allocateFee: Owner can allocate protocol's fee to stakers.

StratRecollateralize.sol

recollateralize: Owner can recollateralize the minting pool.

StratReduceReserveLP.sol

reduceReserve: Owner can remove liquidity, buy back YToken and burn.

To make the smart contract 100% decentralized, we suggest renouncing ownership in the airdrop smart contract once its function is completed.

Conclusion

We were given a contract code in the form of files. And we have used all possible tests

based on given objects as files. We had observed some low severity issues in the smart

contracts. So, the smart contracts are ready for the mainnet deployment.

Since possible test cases can be unlimited for such smart contracts protocol, we provide

no such guarantee of future outcomes. We have used all the latest static tools and manual

observations to cover maximum possible test cases to scan everything.

Smart contracts within the scope were manually reviewed and analyzed with static

analysis tools. Smart Contract's high-level description of functionality was presented in the

As-is overview section of the report.

Audit report contains all found security vulnerabilities and other issues in the reviewed

code.

Security state of the reviewed contract, based on standard audit procedure scope, is

"Secured".

Our Methodology

We like to work with a transparent process and make our reviews a collaborative effort.

The goals of our security audits are to improve the quality of systems we review and aim

for sufficient remediation to help protect users. The following is the methodology we use in

our security audit process.

Manual Code Review:

In manually reviewing all of the code, we look for any potential issues with code logic, error

handling, protocol and header parsing, cryptographic errors, and random number

generators. We also watch for areas where more defensive programming could reduce the

risk of future mistakes and speed up future audits. Although our primary focus is on the

in-scope code, we examine dependency code and behavior when it is relevant to a

particular line of investigation.

Vulnerability Analysis:

Our audit techniques included manual code analysis, user interface interaction, and

whitebox penetration testing. We look at the project's web site to get a high level

understanding of what functionality the software under review provides. We then meet with

the developers to gain an appreciation of their vision of the software. We install and use

the relevant software, exploring the user interactions and roles. While we do this, we

brainstorm threat models and attack surfaces. We read design documentation, review

other audit results, search for similar projects, examine source code dependencies, skim

open issue tickets, and generally investigate details other than the implementation.

Documenting Results:

We follow a conservative, transparent process for analyzing potential security vulnerabilities and seeing them through successful remediation. Whenever a potential issue is discovered, we immediately create an Issue entry for it in this document, even though we have not yet verified the feasibility and impact of the issue. This process is conservative because we document our suspicions early even if they are later shown to not represent exploitable vulnerabilities. We generally follow a process of first documenting the suspicion with unresolved questions, then confirming the issue through code analysis, live experimentation, or automated tests. Code analysis is the most tentative, and we strive to provide test code, log captures, or screenshots demonstrating our confirmation. After this we analyze the feasibility of an attack in a live system.

Suggested Solutions:

We search for immediate mitigations that live deployments can take, and finally we suggest the requirements for remediation engineering for future releases. The mitigation and remediation recommendations should be scrutinized by the developers and deployment engineers, and successful mitigation and remediation is an ongoing collaborative process after we deliver our report, and before the details are made public.

Disclaimers

EtherAuthority.io Disclaimer

EtherAuthority team has analyzed this smart contract in accordance with the best industry practices at the date of this report, in relation to: cybersecurity vulnerabilities and issues in smart contract source code, the details of which are disclosed in this report, (Source Code); the Source Code compilation, deployment and functionality (performing the intended functions).

Due to the fact that the total number of test cases are unlimited, the audit makes no statements or warranties on security of the code. It also cannot be considered as a sufficient assessment regarding the utility and safety of the code, bugfree status or any other statements of the contract. While we have done our best in conducting the analysis and producing this report, it is important to note that you should not rely on this report only. We also suggest conducting a bug bounty program to confirm the high level of security of this smart contract.


Technical Disclaimer

Smart contracts are deployed and executed on the blockchain platform. The platform, its programming language, and other software related to the smart contract can have their own vulnerabilities that can lead to hacks. Thus, the audit can't guarantee explicit security of the audited smart contracts.

Appendix

Code Flow Diagram - TheIronMan Finance


Pool Diagram




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SwapStrategyPOL Diagram




DaoChef Diagram




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DaoStaking Diagram





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DaoZapMMSwap Diagram




NFTController Diagram






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
EcosystemFund Diagram




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Fund Diagram






MasterOracle Diagram



UniswapPairOracle Diagram



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XToken Diagram C XToken Ownable ERC20Burnable ○ <u>address=>bool</u> allowedMinters __constructor__()setMinter() removeMinter() mint() C ERC20Burnable Context ERC20 burn()burnFrom() C ERC20 Context IERC20 Ownable SafeMath for uint256 ■•Address for address □ address=>uint256 _balances □ address=>mapping address=>uint256 _allowances □ uint256 _totalSupply string _name □ string _symbol □ uint8 _decimals _constructor__() QgetOwner() Qname() Qdecimals() Qsymbol()QtotalSupply() QbalanceOf() transfer() Qallowance() approve()transferFrom() increaseAllowance() decreaseAllowance() mint() _transfer() _mint() _burn() approve() burnFrom() for uint256, for address I IERC20 (C) Ownable (A) SafeMath Context Address QtotalSupply() (A) Q decimals() Qadd() Qsymbol() □ <u>address</u> _owner Qsub() QisContract() Qname() Qmul() sendValue() _constructor__() QgetOwner() Qdiv() Qmod() functionCall() functionCallWith∀alue() QbalanceOf() Qowner() ♦ Q_checkOwner() • transfer() • Qallowance() Qmin() _functionCallWith∀alue() renounceOwnership() Qsqrt() transferOwnership() approve() _transferOwnership() transferFrom() C Context Q_msgSender() Q_msgData()

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YToken Diagram C YToken ERC20Burnable _constructor_() C ERC20Burnable Context ERC20 o burn() burnFrom() C ERC20 Context IERC20 Ownable ₩SafeMath for uint256 #NAddress for address □ address=>uint256 _balances □ address=>mapping address=>uint256 _allowances □ uint256 _totalSupply □ string _name □ string _symbol □ uint8 _decimals _constructor_()QgetOwner() Qname() Qdecimals() Qsymbol()QtotalSupply() QbalanceOf() transfer() Qallowance() approve() transferFrom() increaseAllowance() decreaseAllowance() mint() _transfer() _mint() _burn() _approve() _burnFrom() for uint256 for address I IERC20 C Ownable (A) SafeMath Context A Address QtotalSupply() Q decimals() Qadd() Qsymbol() Qsub() QisContract() □ address _owner Qname() QgetOwner() Qmul() Qdiv() send∀alue() _constructor__() functionCall() functionCall/VithValue() • Qowner() QbalanceOf() Qmod() Q_checkOwner()renounceOwnership() transfer() Qmin() _functionCalfWithValue() Qallowance() Qsqrt() approve() transferOwnership() transferFrom() _transferOwnership()


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C Context

Q_msgSender()

Q_msgData()

IMT Diagram




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
COREX Diagram C COREX XToken uint256 GENESIS_SUPPLY address operator bool openTrading address=>bool whitelistAddresses _constructor__() OpenTrade() includeToVVhitelist() excludeFromWhitlist() _transfer() (C) XToken Ownable ERC20Burnable address=>bool allowedMinters _constructor__()setMinter()removeMinter()mint() C ERC20Burnable ERC20 burn()burnFrom() C ERC20 IERC20 Ownable w.SafeMath for uint256 anddress for address address=>uint256 _balances □ address=>mapping address=>uint256 _allowances □ uint256 _totalSupply □ string _name □ <u>string</u> _symbol □ <u>uint8</u> _decimals _constructor__() QgetOwner() QgetOwner() Qname() Qdecimals() Qsymbol() QtotalSupply() QbalanceOf() transfer() Qallowance() approve() transferFrom() increaseAllowance() decreaseAllowance() mint() _transfer() _mint() 0 burn() _burn() _approve() _burnFrom() for uint256, for address C Ownable I IERC20 A SafeMath Context (A) Address QtotalSupply() Qdecimals() Qadd() Qsymbol() Qname() QgetOwner() QbalanceOf() 0 Qsub() Qmul() Qdiv() Qmod() □ <u>address</u> _owner QisContract() constructor_() Qowner() Q_checkOwner() renounceOwnership() transferOwnership() sendValue() functionCall() functionCallWith∀alue() 0 transfer() Qallowance() Qmin() Qsqrt() _functionCallV/ith∀alue() approve() _transferOwnership() transferFrom() C Context Q_msgSender() Q_msgData()

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
DaoTreasury Diagram



StratRecollateralize Diagram



StratReduceReserveLP Diagram



Slither Results Log

Slither log >> Pool.sol

```
Pool.setTreasury(address)._treasury (Pool.sol#1582) lacks a zero-check on :
- treasury = _treasury (Pool.sol#1584)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#missing-zero-address-validation
Reentrancy in Pool.mint(uint256) (Pool.sol#1354-1378):
    External calls:
        - WethUtils.wrap(_ethIn) (Pool.sol#1362)
        - IERC20(WethUtils.weth).safeIncreaseAllowance(address(swapStrategy),_wethSwapIn) (Pool.sol#1365)
        - swapStrategy.execute(_wethSwapIn,_yTokenOutTwap) (Pool.sol#1366)
        State variables written after the call(s):
        - unclaimedXToken = unclaimedXToken + _xTokenOut (Pool.sol#1371)
        - userInfo[_sender].xTokenBalance = userInfo[_sender].xTokenBalance + _xTokenOut (Pool.sol#1370)
        - userInfo[_sender].lastAction = block.number (Pool.sol#1374)
        Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-2
 Reentrancy in Pool.recollateralize() (Pool.sol#1468-1473):
External calls:
- WethUtils.wrap(_amount) (Pool.sol#1471)
Event emitted after the call(s):
- Recollateralized(msg.sender,_amount) (Pool.sol#1472)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-3
  Pool.refreshCollateralRatio() (Pool.sol#1321-1347) uses timestamp for comparisons
 Dangerous comparisons:
- require(bool,string)(block.timestamp - lastRefreshCrTimestamp >= refreshCooldown,Pool::refreshCollateralRatio: Must
wait for the refresh cooldown since last refresh) (Pool.sol#1323)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#block-timestamp
   Pool.refreshCollateralRatio() (Pool.sol#1321-1347) compares to a boolean constant:
-require(bool,string)(collateralRatioPaused == false,Pool::refreshCollateralRatio: Collateral Ratio has been paused) (
 Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#boolean-equality
                       version0.8.4 (Pool.sol#3) allows old version:
8.4 is not recommended for deployment
 solc-0.8.4 is not recommended for deployment
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity
Function IUniswapV2Router01.WETH() (Pool.sol#33) is not in mixedCase
Constant WethUtils.weth (Pool.sol#562) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
Parameter Pool.calcMint(uint256). ethIn (Pool.sol#252) is not in mixedCase
Parameter Pool.calcRedeem(uint256). xTokenIn (Pool.sol#277) is not in mixedCase
Parameter Pool.mint(uint256). mintXTokenOut (Pool.sol#277) is not in mixedCase
Parameter Pool.redeem(uint256,uint256). init256). xTokenIn (Pool.sol#331) is not in mixedCase
Parameter Pool.redeem(uint256,uint256). mintYTokenOut (Pool.sol#332) is not in mixedCase
Parameter Pool.redeem(uint256,uint256). mintYTokenOut (Pool.sol#332) is not in mixedCase
Parameter Pool.redeem(uint256,uint256). mintEthOut (Pool.sol#338) is not in mixedCase
Parameter Pool.checkPriceFluctuation(uint256,uint256). _yAmountSpotPrice (Pool.sol#1475) is not in mixedCase
Parameter Pool.checkPriceFluctuation(uint256,uint256). _yAmountSpotPrice (Pool.sol#1475) is not in mixedCase
Parameter Pool.setCollateralRatioOptions(uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256)._ratioStepUp (Pool.sol#1507) is not in mixedCase
Parameter Pool.setCollateralRatioOptionS(uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256)._ratioStepUp (Pool.sol#1507) is not in mixedCase
Parameter Pool.setCollateralRatioOptionS(uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256)._ratioStepDown (Pool.sol#1508) is not in mixedCase
Parameter Pool.setCollateralRatioOptionS(uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256)._refreshCooldown (Pool.sol#1510) is not in mixedCase
Parameter Pool.setCollateralRatioOptionS(uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256)._refreshCooldown (Pool.sol#1510) is not in mixedCase
Parameter Pool.setFees(uint256,uint256)._mintingFee (Pool.sol#1531) is not in mixedCase
Parameter Pool.setFees(uint256,uint256)._mintingFee (Pool.sol#1531) is not in mixedCase
Parameter Pool.setMincOllateralRatio(uint256)._mintingFee (Pool.sol#1531) is not in mixedCase
Parameter Pool.setMincOllateralRatio(uint256)._mintingFee (Pool.sol#1531) is not in mixedCase
Parameter Pool.setSwapStrategy(ISwapStrategy)._swapStrategy(Pool.sol#1541) is not in mixedCase
Parame
 Parameter Pool.setSwapStrategy(ISwapStrategy)._swapStrategy (Pool.sol#1559) is not in m Parameter Pool.setOracle(IMasterOracle)._oracle (Pool.sol#1567) is not in mixedCase Parameter Pool.setYTokenSlippage(uint256)._slippage (Pool.sol#1574) is not in mixedCase Parameter Pool.setTreasury(address)._treasury (Pool.sol#1582) is not in mixedCase Parameter Pool.transferToTreasury(uint256)._amount (Pool.sol#1589) is not in mixedCase
  Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions
   Pool.setYTokenSlippage(uint256) (Pool.sol#1574-1578) uses literals with too many digits:
- require(bool,string)(_slippage <= 300000,Pool::setYTokenSlippage: yTokenSlippage cannot be more than 30%) (Pool.sol#
 - yTokenSlippage = 200000 (Pool.sol#1191)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#too-many-digits
 Pool.priceTarget (Pool.sol#1188) should be constant
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#state-variables-that-could-be-declared-constant
 ERC20._name (Pool.sol#820) should be immutable
ERC20._symbol (Pool.sol#821) should be immutable
Pool.xToken (Pool.sol#1159) should be immutable
Pool.yToken (Pool.sol#1160) should be immutable
Pool.yToken (Pool.sol#1161) should be immutable
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#state-variables-that-could-be-declared-immutable
Pool.sol analyzed (19 contracts with 84 detectors), 81 result(s) found
```

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Slither log >> SwapStrategyPOL.sol

```
SwapStrategyPOL.slitherConstructorVariables() (SwapStrategyPOL.sol#700-818) uses literals with too many digits:
- swapSlippage = 200000 (SwapStrategyPOL.sol#708)

Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#too-many-digits
SwapStrategyPOL.sol analyzed (13 contracts with 84 detectors), 37 result(s) found
```

Slither log >> DaoChef.sol

```
Parameter DaoChef.getSlots(address,uint256)._account (DaoChef.sol#845) is not in mixedCase
Parameter DaoChef.getTokenIds(address,uint256)._pid (DaoChef.sol#845) is not in mixedCase
Parameter DaoChef.getTokenIds(address,uint256)._pid (DaoChef.sol#858) is not in mixedCase
Parameter DaoChef.getTokenIds(address,uint256)._pid (DaoChef.sol#858) is not in mixedCase
Parameter DaoChef.depositNFT(address,uint256,uint256)._pid (DaoChef.sol#873) is not in mixedCase
Parameter DaoChef.depositNFT(address,uint256,uint256,uint256)._tokenId (DaoChef.sol#873) is not in mixedCase
Parameter DaoChef.depositNFT(address,uint256,uint256,uint256)._slotIndex (DaoChef.sol#874) is not in mixedCase
Parameter DaoChef.depositNFT(address,uint256,uint256)._pid (DaoChef.sol#875) is not in mixedCase
Parameter DaoChef.withdrawNFT(uint256,uint256)._slotIndex (DaoChef.sol#894) is not in mixedCase
Parameter DaoChef.withdrawNFT(uint256,uint256)._pid (DaoChef.sol#894) is not in mixedCase
Parameter DaoChef.setNftController(address)._controller (DaoChef.sol#908) is not in mixedCase
Parameter DaoChef.setNftBoostRate(uint256)._rate (DaoChef.sol#913) is not in mixedCase
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions

Redundant expression "this (DaoChef.sol#462)" inContext (DaoChef.sol#456-465)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#redundant-statements
DaoChef.sol analyzed (11 contracts with 84 detectors), 61 result(s) found
```

Slither log >> DaoStaking.sol

Slither log >> DaoZapMMSwap.sol

Slither log >> NFTController.sol

Slither log >> DevFund.sol

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```
Dangerous comparisons:
- block.timestamp <= _start (DevFund.sol#598)
- block.timestamp > _start + _duration (DevFund.sol#601)
Fund.transfer(address,uint256) (DevFund.sol#612-619) uses timestamp for comparisons
Dangerous comparisons:
- require(bool,string)(amount <= claimable(),Fund::transfer: > vestedAmount) (DevFund.sol#615)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#block-timestamp
Pragma version0.8.4 (DevFund.sol#3) allows old versions
solc-0.8.4 is not recommended for deployment
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity
Parameter Fund.initialize(address)._yToken (DevFund.sol#577) is not in mixedCase Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#redundant-statements
DevFund.sol analyzed (8 contracts with 84 detectors), 24 result(s) found
```

Slither log >> EcosystemFund.sol

```
Pragma version0.8.4 (EcosystemFund.sol#3) allows old versions solc-0.8.4 is not recommended for deployment Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity
Parameter Fund.initialize(address)._yToken (EcosystemFund.sol#577) is not in mixedCase Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#redund
EcosystemFund.sol analyzed (8 contracts with 84 detectors), 24 result(s) found
```

Slither log >> Fund.sol

```
Fund.transfer(address,uint256) (Fund.sol#612-619) should emit an event for:
- claimedAmount = claimedAmount + amount (Fund.sol#617)

    claimedAmount = claimedAmount + amount (Fund.sol#617)
    Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#missing-events-arithmetic

 Dangerous comparisons:
- block.timestamp <= _start (Fund.sol#598)
- block.timestamp > _start + _duration (Fund.sol#601)
Fund.transfer(address,uint256) (Fund.sol#612-619) uses timestamp for comparisons
Dangerous comparisons:
- require(bool,string)(amount <= claimable(),Fund::transfer: > vestedAmount) (Fund.sol#615)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#block-timestamp
Parameter Fund.initialize(address)._yToken (Fund.sol#577) is not in mixedCase Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions
Redundant expression "this (Fund.sol#498)" inContext (Fund.sol#492-501)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#redundant-statements
 Fund (Fund.sol#570-621) does not implement functions:
- Fund.allocation() (Fund.sol#584)
- Fund.vestingDuration() (Fund.sol#588)
- Fund.vestingStart() (Fund.sol#586)

Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#unimplemented-functions
Fund.sol analyzed (7 contracts with 84 detectors), 26 result(s) found
```

Slither log >> Reserve.sol

```
Reserve.setRewarder(address)._rewarder (Reserve.sol#584) lacks a zero-check on :
- rewarder = _rewarder (Reserve.sol#586)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#missing-zero-address-validation
Pragma version0.8.4 (Reserve.sol#3) allows old versions
solc-0.8.4 is not recommended for deployment
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity
Parameter Reserve.initialize(address)._imt (Reserve.sol#577) is not in mixedCase
Parameter Reserve.setRewarder(address)._rewarder (Reserve.sol#584) is not in mixedCase
Parameter Reserve.setPool(address)._pool (Reserve.sol#590) is not in mixedCase
Parameter Reserve.removePool(address)._pool (Reserve.sol#596) is not in mixedCase
Parameter Reserve.transfer(address,uint256)._to (Reserve.sol#602) is not in mixedCase
Parameter Reserve.transfer(address,uint256)._amount (Reserve.sol#602) is not in mixedCase
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions
Redundant expression "this (Reserve.sol#386)" inContext (Reserve.sol#380-389)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#redundant-statements
Reserve.sol analyzed (7 contracts with 84 detectors), 30 result(s) found
```

Slither log >> MasterOracle.sol

```
Context._msgData() (MasterOracle.sol#19-22) is never used and should be removed
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#dead-code
Pragma version0.8.4 (MasterOracle.sol#3) allows old versions
solc-0.8.4 is not recommended for deployment
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity
Redundant expression "this (MasterOracle.sol#20)" inContext (MasterOracle.sol#14-23)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#redundant-statements
Variable MasterOracle.constructor(address,address,address,address)._oracleXToken (MasterOracle.sol#102) is too similar to Mast
erOracle.constructor(address,address,address,address). oracleYToken (MasterOracle.sol#103)
Variable MasterOracle.oracleXToken (MasterOracle.sol#93) is too similar to MasterOracle.oracleYToken (MasterOracle.sol#94)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#variable-names-too-similar
MasterOracle.oracleXToken (MasterOracle.sol#93) should be immutable
MasterOracle.oracleYToken (MasterOracle.sol#94) should be immutable
MasterOracle.xToken (MasterOracle.sol#96) should be immutable
MasterOracle.yToken (MasterOracle.sol#97) should be immutable
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#state-variables-that-could-be-declared-immutable
MasterOracle.sol analyzed (4 contracts with 84 detectors), 10 result(s) found
```

Slither log >> UniswapPairOracle.sol

```
Variable UniswapPairOracle.spot(address,uint256). token0MissingDecimals (UniswapPairOracle.sol#820) is too similar to UniswapPairOracle.spot(address,uint256). token0MissingDecimals (UniswapPairOracle.sol#821)
Variable UniswapPairOracle.twap(address,uint256). token0MissingDecimals (UniswapPairOracle.sol#799) is too similar to UniswapPairOracle.twap(address,uint256). token0MissingDecimals (UniswapPairOracle.sol#799) is too similar to UniswapPairOracle.twap(address,uint256). token0MissingDecimals (UniswapPairOracle.sol#799) is too similar to UniswapPairOracle.spot(address,uint256). token0MissingDecimals (UniswapPairOracle.sol#799) is too similar to UniswapPairOracle.spot(address,uint256). token0MissingDecimals (UniswapPairOracle.sol#820) is too similar to UniswapPairOracle.twap(address,uint256). token1MissingDecimals (UniswapPairOracle.sol#820) is too similar to UniswapPairOracle.twap(address,uint256). token1MissingDecimals (UniswapPairOracle.sol#840) is too similar to UniswapPairOracle.update().price1CumulativePrices(address).price0Cumulative (UniswapPairOracle.sol#840) is too similar to UniswapPairOracle.currentCumulativePrices(address).price0Cumulative (UniswapPairOracle.sol#840) is too similar to UniswapPairOracle.currentCumulativePrices(address).price1Cumulative (UniswapPairOracle.sol#841)
Variable UniswapPairOracle.update().price0Cumulative (UniswapPairOracle.sol#770) is too similar to UniswapPairOracle.update().price0Cumulative (UniswapPairOracle.sol#770) is too similar to UniswapPairOracle.currentCumulativePrices(address).price1Cumulative (UniswapPairOracle.sol#770) is too similar to UniswapPairOracle.currentCumulativePrices(address).price1Cumulative (UniswapPairOracle.sol#742) is too similar to UniswapPairOracle.price1Cumulative velast (UniswapPairOracle.sol#743)
Variable UniswapPairOracle.price0CumulativeLast (UniswapPairOracle.sol#745) is too similar to UniswapPairOracle.price1Average (UniswapPairOracle.sol#745)
   Variable UniswapPairOracle.price0Áverage (UniswapPairOracle.sol#745) is too similar to UniswapPairOracle.price1Average (Uniswa
pPairOracle.sol#746)
   .
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#variable-names-too-similar
  - IERC20.getOwner() (UniswapPairOracle.sol#317)
- IERC20Metadata.name() (UniswapPairOracle.sol#341)
- IERC20Metadata.symbol() (UniswapPairOracle.sol#346)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#unimplemented-functions
  ERC20._name (UniswapPairOracle.sol#437) should be immutable
ERC20._symbol (UniswapPairOracle.sol#438) should be immutable
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#state-variables-that-could-be-declared-immutable
UniswapPairOracle.sol analyzed (12 contracts with 84 detectors), 61 result(s) found
```

Slither log >> XToken.sol

Slither log >> YToken.sol

Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#redundant-state
YToken.sol analyzed (8 contracts with 84 detectors), 27 result(s) found

Slither log >> IMT.sol

Slither log >> COREX.sol

Slither log >> DaoTreasury.sol

Slither log >> StratRecollateralize.sol

Slither log >> StratReduceReserveLP.sol

Solidity Static Analysis

Pool.sol

Security

Check-effects-interaction:

Potential violation of Checks-Effects-Interaction pattern in

Pool.refreshCollateralRatio(): Could potentially lead to re-entrancy vulnerability.

Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.

<u>more</u>

Pos: 196:4:

Gas & Economy

Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function Pool.refreshCollateralRatio is infinite: If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)

Pos: 196:4:

Miscellaneous

Constant/View/Pure functions:

ISwapStrategy.execute(uint256,uint256): Potentially should be constant/view/pure but is not. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.

more

Pos: 6:4:

Guard conditions:

Use "assert(x)" if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use "require(x)" if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.

<u>more</u>

Pos: 465:8:

SwapStrategyPOL.sol

Security

Check-effects-interaction:

Potential violation of Checks-Effects-Interaction pattern in SwapStrategyPOL.execute(uint256,uint256): Could potentially lead to reentrancy vulnerability. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.

more

Pos: 55:4:

Gas & Economy

Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function SwapStrategyPOL.execute is infinite: If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)
Pos: 55:4:

Miscellaneous

Constant/View/Pure functions:

ISwapStrategy.execute(uint256,uint256): Potentially should be constant/view/pure but is not. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.

more

Pos: 6:4:

Guard conditions:

Use "assert(x)" if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use "require(x)" if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.

more

Pos: 128:8:

DaoChef.sol

Security

Check-effects-interaction:

Potential violation of Checks-Effects-Interaction pattern in DaoChef.updatePool(uint256): Could potentially lead to re-entrancy vulnerability. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.

Pos: 81:4:

more

Gas & Economy

Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function DaoChef.harvest is infinite: If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)

Pos: 161:4:

Miscellaneous

Guard conditions:

Use "assert(x)" if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use "require(x)" if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.

<u>more</u>

Pos: 394:8:

DaoStaking.sol

Security

Check-effects-interaction:

Potential violation of Checks-Effects-Interaction pattern in

DaoStaking.getReward(): Could potentially lead to re-entrancy vulnerability.

Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.

more

Pos: 355:4:

Gas & Economy

Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function DaoStaking.earnedBalances is infinite: If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)

Pos: 193:4:

Delete dynamic array:

The "delete" operation when applied to a dynamically sized array in Solidity generates code to delete each of the elements contained. If the array is large, this operation can surpass the block gas limit and raise an OOG exception. Also nested dynamically sized objects can produce the same results.

more

Pos: 398:12:

For loop over dynamic array:

Loops that do not have a fixed number of iterations, for example, loops that depend on storage values, have to be used carefully. Due to the block gas limit, transactions can only consume a certain amount of gas. The number of iterations in a loop can grow beyond the block gas limit which can cause the complete contract to be stalled at a certain point. Additionally, using unbounded loops incurs in a lot of avoidable gas costs. Carefully test how many items at maximum you can pass to such functions to make it successful.

<u>more</u>

Pos: 482:8:

Miscellaneous

Guard conditions:

Use "assert(x)" if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use "require(x)" if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.

<u>more</u>

Pos: 460:8:

Delete from dynamic array:

Using "delete" on an array leaves a gap. The length of the array remains the same. If you want to remove the empty position you need to shift items manually and update the "length" property.

<u>more</u>

Pos: 329:24:

DaoZapMMSwap.sol

Security

Block timestamp:

Use of "block.timestamp": "block.timestamp" can be influenced by miners to a certain degree. That means that a miner can "choose" the block.timestamp, to a certain degree, to change the outcome of a transaction in the mined block. more

Pos: 144:94:

Gas & Economy

Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function DaoZapMMSwap.removeZap is infinite: If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)

Pos: 195:4:

Miscellaneous

Guard conditions:

Use "assert(x)" if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use "require(x)" if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.

<u>more</u>

Pos: 196:8:

NFTController.sol

Gas & Economy

Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function NFTController.getBoostRate is infinite: If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)

Pos: 55:4:

Miscellaneous

Guard conditions:

Use "assert(x)" if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use "require(x)" if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.

<u>more</u>

Pos: 37:8:

DevFund.sol

Security

Block timestamp:

Use of "block.timestamp": "block.timestamp" can be influenced by miners to a certain degree. That means that a miner can "choose" the block.timestamp, to a certain degree, to change the outcome of a transaction in the mined block.

more

Pos: 44:31:

Gas & Economy

Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function DevFund.currentBalance is infinite: If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)
Pos: 30:4:

Miscellaneous

Guard conditions:

Use "assert(x)" if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use "require(x)" if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.

more

Pos: 55:8:

EcosystemFund.sol

Security

Block timestamp:

Use of "block.timestamp": "block.timestamp" can be influenced by miners to a certain degree. That means that a miner can "choose" the block.timestamp, to a certain degree, to change the outcome of a transaction in the mined block.

more

Pos: 38:12:

Gas & Economy

Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function EcosystemFund.claimable is infinite: If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)

Pos: 47:4:

Miscellaneous

Data truncated:

Division of integer values yields an integer value again. That means e.g. 10 / 100 = 0 instead of 0.1 since the result is an integer again. This does not hold for division of (only) literal values since those yield rational constants. Pos: 44:15:

Fund.sol

Security

Block timestamp:

Use of "block.timestamp": "block.timestamp" can be influenced by miners to a certain degree. That means that a miner can "choose" the block.timestamp, to a certain degree, to change the outcome of a transaction in the mined block.

<u>more</u>

Pos: 38:12:

Miscellaneous

Guard conditions:

Use "assert(x)" if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use "require(x)" if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.

<u>more</u>

Pos: 55:8:

Reserve.sol

Miscellaneous

Constant/View/Pure functions:

Reserve.transfer(address,uint256): Potentially should be constant/view/pure but is not. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.

<u>more</u>

Pos: 45:4:

Guard conditions:

Use "assert(x)" if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use "require(x)" if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.

<u>more</u>

Pos: 21:8:

MasterOracle.sol

Gas & Economy

Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function MasterOracle.getXTokenPrice is infinite: If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)

Pos: 33:4:

Miscellaneous

Guard conditions:

Use "assert(x)" if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use "require(x)" if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.

more

Pos: 26:8:

UniswapPairOracle.sol

Security

Block timestamp:

Use of "block.timestamp": "block.timestamp" can be influenced by miners to a certain degree. That means that a miner can "choose" the block.timestamp, to a certain degree, to change the outcome of a transaction in the mined block.

<u>more</u>

Pos: 112:22:

Gas & Economy

Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function UniswapPairOracle.spot is infinite: If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)

Pos: 93:4:

Miscellaneous

Guard conditions:

Use "assert(x)" if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use "require(x)" if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.

<u>more</u>

Pos: 86:12:

XToken.sol

Miscellaneous

Guard conditions:

Use "assert(x)" if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use "require(x)" if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.

more

Pos: 33:8:

Miscellaneous

Guard conditions:

Use "assert(x)" if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use "require(x)" if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.

more

Pos: 54:8:

COREX.sol

Gas & Economy

Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function COREX.mint is infinite: If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)

Pos: 40:4:

Miscellaneous

Constant/View/Pure functions:

COREX._transfer(address,address,uint256): Potentially should be constant/view/pure but is not. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.

<u>more</u>

Pos: 39:4:

DaoTreasury.sol

Security

Check-effects-interaction:

Potential violation of Checks-Effects-Interaction pattern in

DaoTreasury.allocateFee(address,uint256): Could potentially lead to re-entrancy vulnerability. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.

more

Pos: 77:4:

Gas & Economy

Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function DaoTreasury.removeStrategy is infinite: If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)
Pos: 60:4:

For loop over dynamic array:

Loops that do not have a fixed number of iterations, for example, loops that depend on storage values, have to be used carefully. Due to the block gas limit, transactions can only consume a certain amount of gas. The number of iterations in a loop can grow beyond the block gas limit which can cause the complete contract to be stalled at a certain point. Additionally, using unbounded loops incurs in a lot of avoidable gas costs. Carefully test how many items at maximum you can pass to such functions to make it successful.

more

Pos: 64:8:

Miscellaneous

Delete from dynamic array:

Using "delete" on an array leaves a gap. The length of the array remains the same. If you want to remove the empty position you need to shift items manually and update the "length" property.

<u>more</u>

Pos: 62:8:

StratRecollateralize.sol

Security

Check-effects-interaction:

Potential violation of Checks-Effects-Interaction pattern in StratRecollateralize.recollateralize(uint256): Could potentially lead to reentrancy vulnerability. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.

more

Pos: 26:4:

Gas & Economy

Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function StratRecollateralize.recollateralize is infinite: If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)

Pos: 26:4:

Miscellaneous

Guard conditions:

Use "assert(x)" if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use "require(x)" if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.

more

Pos: 28:8:

Security

Block timestamp:

Use of "block.timestamp": "block.timestamp" can be influenced by miners to a certain degree. That means that a miner can "choose" the block.timestamp, to a certain degree, to change the outcome of a transaction in the mined block.

more

Pos: 68:127:

Gas & Economy

Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function StratReduceReserveLP.reduceReserve is infinite: If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)

Pos: 42:4:

Miscellaneous

Guard conditions:

Use "assert(x)" if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use "require(x)" if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.

more

Pos: 44:8:

Solhint Linter

Pool.sol

```
Pool.sol:3:1: Error: Compiler version 0.8.4 does not satisfy the r semver requirement
Pool.sol:19:1: Error: Contract has 24 states declarations but allowed no more than 15
Pool.sol:77:5: Error: Explicitly mark visibility in function (Set ignoreConstructors to true if using solidity >=0.7.0)
Pool.sol:198:17: Error: Avoid to make time-based decisions in your business logic
Pool.sol:220:34: Error: Avoid to make time-based decisions in your business logic
Pool.sol:225:32: Error: Code contains empty blocks
```

SwapStrategyPOL.sol

```
SwapStrategyPOL.sol:3:1: Error: Compiler version 0.8.4 does not satisfy the r semver requirement
SwapStrategyPOL.sol:30:5: Error: Explicitly mark visibility in function (Set ignoreConstructors to true if using solidity >=0.7.0)
SwapStrategyPOL.sol:83:9: Error: Variable name must be in mixedCase
SwapStrategyPOL.sol:84:9: Error: Variable name must be in mixedCase
SwapStrategyPOL.sol:92:127: Error: Avoid to make time-based decisions in your business logic
SwapStrategyPOL.sol:116:17: Error: Avoid to make time-based decisions in your business logic
```

DaoChef.sol

```
DaoChef.sol:3:1: Error: Compiler version 0.8.4 does not satisfy the r semver requirement
DaoChef.sol:70:13: Error: Avoid to make time-based decisions in your business logic
DaoChef.sol:71:28: Error: Avoid to make time-based decisions in your business logic
DaoChef.sol:83:13: Error: Avoid to make time-based decisions in your business logic
DaoChef.sol:86:32: Error: Avoid to make time-based decisions in your business logic
DaoChef.sol:90:35: Error: Avoid to make time-based decisions in your business logic
DaoChef.sol:274:73: Error: Avoid to make time-based decisions in your business logic
```

DaoStaking.sol

```
DaoStaking.sol:3:1: Error: Compiler version 0.8.4 does not satisfy the r semver requirement
DaoStaking.sol:15:1: Error: Contract has 16 states declarations but allowed no more than 15DaoStaking.sol:54:29: Error: Constant name must be in capitalized SNAKE_CASE
DaoStaking.sol:81:5: Error: Explicitly mark visibility in function (Set ignoreConstructors to true if using solidity >=0.7.0)
DaoStaking.sol:97:52: Error: Avoid to make time-based decisions in your business logic
DaoStaking.sol:98:50: Error: Avoid to make time-based decisions in your business logic
DaoStaking.sol:424:52: Error: Avoid to make time-based decisions in your business logic
DaoStaking.sol:425:50: Error: Avoid to make time-based decisions in your business logic
DaoStaking.sol:425:50: Error: Code contains empty blocks
DaoStaking.sol:495:32: Error: Code contains empty blocks
DaoStaking.sol:507:5: Error: Event name must be in CamelCase
DaoStaking.sol:508:5: Error: Event name must be in CamelCase
```

DaoZapMMSwap.sol

```
DaoZapMMSwap.sol:3:1: Error: Compiler version 0.8.4 does not satisfy the r semver requirement
DaoZapMMSwap.sol:35:5: Error: Explicitly mark visibility in function (Set ignoreConstructors to true if using solidity >=0.7.0)
DaoZapMMSwap.sol:80:13: Error: Avoid to make time-based decisions in your business logic
DaoZapMMSwap.sol:102:32: Error: Code contains empty blocks
DaoZapMMSwap.sol:144:95: Error: Avoid to make time-based decisions in your business logic
DaoZapMMSwap.sol:169:9: Error: Variable name must be in mixedCase
DaoZapMMSwap.sol:170:9: Error: Variable name must be in mixedCase
```

NFTController.sol

```
NFTController.sol:3:1: Error: Compiler version 0.8.4 does not satisfy the r semver requirement
NFTController.sol:14:5: Error: Explicitly mark visibility in function (Set ignoreConstructors to true if using solidity >=0.7.0)
NFTController.sol:14:20: Error: Code contains empty blocks
NFTController.sol:48:5: Error: Explicitly mark visibility in function (Set ignoreConstructors to true if using solidity >=0.7.0)
NFTController.sol:48:19: Error: Code contains empty blocks
```

DevFund.sol

```
DevFund.sol:3:1: Error: Compiler version 0.8.4 does not satisfy the r semver requirement
```

EcosystemFund.sol

```
EcosystemFund.sol:3:1: Error: Compiler version 0.8.4 does not satisfy the r semver requirement
```

Reserve.sol

```
Reserve.sol:3:1: Error: Compiler version 0.8.4 does not satisfy the r semver requirement
```

Fund.sol

```
Fund.sol:3:1: Error: Compiler version 0.8.4 does not satisfy the r semver requirement
Fund.sol:38:13: Error: Avoid to make time-based decisions in your business logic
Fund.sol:41:13: Error: Avoid to make time-based decisions in your business logic
Fund.sol:44:32: Error: Avoid to make time-based decisions in your business logic
```

MasterOracle.sol

```
MasterOracle.sol:3:1: Error: Compiler version 0.8.4 does not satisfy the r semver requirement
MasterOracle.sol:17:5: Error: Explicitly mark visibility in function
(Set ignoreConstructors to true if using solidity >=0.7.0)
```

UniswapPairOracle.sol

```
UniswapPairOracle.sol:54:18: Error: Parse error: missing ';' at '{'
UniswapPairOracle.sol:133:18: Error: Parse error: missing ';' at '{'
```

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XToken.sol

```
XToken.sol:3:1: Error: Compiler version 0.8.4 does not satisfy the r semver requirement
XToken.sol:21:5: Error: Explicitly mark visibility in function (Set ignoreConstructors to true if using solidity >=0.7.0)
XToken.sol:21:83: Error: Code contains empty blocks
```

YToken.sol

```
YToken.sol:3:1: Error: Compiler version 0.8.4 does not satisfy the r semver requirement
YToken.sol:8:5: Error: Explicitly mark visibility in function (Set ignoreConstructors to true if using solidity >=0.7.0)
YToken.sol:8:83: Error: Code contains empty blocks
```

COREX.sol

```
COREX.sol:3:1: Error: Compiler version 0.8.4 does not satisfy the r semver requirement COREX.sol:14:5: Error: Explicitly mark visibility in function (Set ignoreConstructors to true if using solidity >=0.7.0) COREX.sol:19:5: Error: Function name must be in mixedCase
```

IMT.sol

```
IMT.sol:3:1: Error: Compiler version 0.8.4 does not satisfy the r
semver requirement
IMT.sol:14:5: Error: Explicitly mark visibility in function (Set
ignoreConstructors to true if using solidity >=0.7.0)
IMT.sol:29:5: Error: Function name must be in mixedCase
```

StratRecollateralize.sol

```
StratRecollateralize.sol:3:1: Error: Compiler version 0.8.4 does not satisfy the r semver requirement
StratRecollateralize.sol:19:5: Error: Explicitly mark visibility in function (Set ignoreConstructors to true if using solidity >=0.7.0)
StratRecollateralize.sol:39:32: Error: Code contains empty blocks
```

StratReduceReserveLP.sol

```
StratReduceReserveLP.sol:3:1: Error: Compiler version 0.8.4 does not satisfy the r semver requirement
StratReduceReserveLP.sol:22:5: Error: Explicitly mark visibility in function (Set ignoreConstructors to true if using solidity >=0.7.0)
StratReduceReserveLP.sol:51:108: Error: Avoid to make time-based decisions in your business logic
StratReduceReserveLP.sol:68:128: Error: Avoid to make time-based decisions in your business logic
```

DaoTreasury.sol

```
DaoTreasury.sol:3:1: Error: Compiler version 0.8.4 does not satisfy the r semver requirement
DaoTreasury.sol:23:5: Error: Explicitly mark visibility in function (Set ignoreConstructors to true if using solidity >=0.7.0)
```

Software analysis result:

These software reported many false positive results and some are informational issues. So, those issues can be safely ignored.

