

etherauthority.io audit@etherauthority.io

SMART CONTRACT

Security Audit Report

Project: Website: Platform: Language: Date:

Aavegotchi GHST Token aavegotchi.com Base Chain Network Solidity June 12th, 2024

Table of contents

Introduction4
Project Background4
Audit Scope6
Code Audit History7
Severity Definitions7
Claimed Smart Contract Features
Audit Summary9
Technical Quick Stats 10
Business Risk Analysis 11
Code Quality 12
Documentation
Use of Dependencies 12
AS-IS overview 13
Audit Findings 14
Conclusion 17
Our Methodology 18
Disclaimers 20
Appendix
Code Flow Diagram
Slither Results Log 22
Solidity static analysis
Solhint Linter

THIS IS SECURITY AUDIT REPORT DOCUMENT AND WHICH MAY CONTAIN INFORMATION WHICH IS CONFIDENTIAL. WHICH INCLUDES ANY POTENTIAL VULNERABILITIES AND MALICIOUS CODES WHICH CAN BE USED TO EXPLOIT THE SOFTWARE. THIS MUST BE REFERRED INTERNALLY AND ONLY SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC AFTER ISSUES ARE RESOLVED.

> This is a private and confidential document. No part of this document should be disclosed to third party without prior written permission of EtherAuthority.

Introduction

As part of EtherAuthority's community smart contracts audit initiatives, the Aavegotchi GHST Token (GHST) smart contract from aavegotchi.com was audited extensively. The audit has been performed using manual analysis as well as using automated software tools. This report presents all the findings regarding the audit performed on June 12th, 2024.

The purpose of this audit was to address the following:

- Ensure that all claimed functions exist and function correctly.
- Identify any security vulnerabilities that may be present in the smart contract.

Project Background

Website Details



- Aavegotchi is a blockchain-based game featuring digital ghosts called Aavegotchis, which are NFTs on the Polygon blockchain.
- Players can customize, trade, and interact with their Aavegotchis through various in-game activities. The platform includes features like staking, yield farming, and mini-games, offering opportunities to earn tokens and rewards.
- Governed by a decentralized autonomous organization (DAO), Aavegotchi promotes community involvement in decision-making.
- It aims to enhance the gaming experience with multi-platform support and dynamic NFT ownership.

Code Details

- This Solidity code defines an ERC20 token that is mintable and burnable via a bridge contract, specifically designed to work with the Optimism Layer 2 solution. Here's an overview of the key components and functionalities:
- Core Contract:
 - Semver: Handles semantic versioning with `MAJOR_VERSION`,
 `MINOR_VERSION`, and `PATCH_VERSION`.
 - ERC20:
 - Implements the standard ERC20 functionality with additional internal functions to handle minting, burning, allowances, and token transfers.
 - Functions include `name`, `symbol`, `decimals`, `totalSupply`, `balanceOf`, `transfer`, `allowance`, `approve`, `transferFrom`, `increaseAllowance`, `decreaseAllowance`, `_transfer`, `_mint`, `_burn`, `_approve`, `_spendAllowance`, `_beforeTokenTransfer`, and `_afterTokenTransfer`.

• OptimismMintableERC20:

- Extends `ERC20` and `Semver` to create a mintable and burnable token for use with the Optimism bridge.
- The constructor takes parameters for the bridge address, remote token address, token name, and symbol.
- The `mint` and `burn` functions can only be called by the bridge contract.
- Implements `supportsInterface` for interface detection.
- This structure ensures that the token adheres to the ERC20 standard while adding the necessary functionalities for integration with the Optimism Layer 2 solution, specifically for minting and burning tokens via a designated bridge contract.

Audit scope

Name	Code Review and Security Analysis Report for Aavegotchi GHST Token (GHST) Smart Contract	
Platform	Base Chain Network	
Language	Solidity	
File	OptimismMintableERC20.sol	
Smart Contract Code	0xcd2f22236dd9dfe2356d7c543161d4d260fd9bcb	
Audit Date	June 12th,2024	
Audit Result	Passed	

This is a private and confidential document. No part of this document should be disclosed to third party without prior written permission of EtherAuthority.

Code Audit History



Severity Definitions

0	Critical	Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to token loss etc.
0	High	High-level vulnerabilities are difficult to exploit; however, they also have significant impact on smart contract execution, e.g. Public access is crucial.
0	Medium	Medium-level vulnerabilities are important to fix; however, they can't lead to tokens lose
0	Low	Low-level vulnerabilities are mostly related to outdated, unused, etc. code snippets, that can't have a significant impact on execution
2	Lowest / Informational / Best Practice	Lowest-level vulnerabilities, code style violations, and info statements can't affect smart contract execution and can be ignored.

This is a private and confidential document. No part of this document should be disclosed to third party without prior written permission of EtherAuthority.

Claimed Smart Contract Features

Claimed Feature Detail	Our Observation
Tokenomics: • Name: Aavegotchi GHST Token • Symbol: GHST • Decimals: 18	YES, This is valid.
 Ownership Control: There are no owner functions, which makes it 100% decentralized. 	YES, This is valid.
 Key Features: Minting and Burning: The `mint` and `burn` functions allow the bridge contract to control the supply of tokens on the Optimism network. Access Control: Only the bridge contract can call the mint and burn functions, ensuring controlled minting and burning processes. Versioning: The `Semver` contract is used to handle versioning, ensuring that different versions of the contract can be managed and identified. Interface Support: The `supportsInterface` function ensures compatibility with the IERC165 standard for interface detection. 	YES, This is valid.

Audit Summary

According to the standard audit assessment, the Customer's solidity-based smart contracts are "**Secured**". This token contract does not have any ownership control, hence it is 100% decentralized.

Unsecured	Poor Secured	Secured	Well Secured
	You are here	5	

We used various tools like Slither, Solhint, and Remix IDE. At the same time, this finding is based on a critical analysis of the manual audit.

All issues found during automated analysis were manually reviewed and applicable vulnerabilities are presented in the Audit Overview section. The general overview is presented in the AS-IS section and all identified issues can be found in the Audit overview section.

We found 0 critical, 0 high, 0 medium, 0 low, and 2 very low-level issues.

Investor Advice: A technical audit of the smart contract does not guarantee the ethical nature of the project. Any owner-controlled functions should be executed by the owner with responsibility. All investors/users are advised to do their due diligence before investing in the project.

Technical Quick Stats

Main Category	egory Subcategory	
Contract		
Programming	The solidity version is too old	Passed
	Integer overflow/underflow	Passed
	Function input parameters lack check	Passed
	Function input parameters check bypass	Passed
	Function access control lacks management	Passed
	Critical operation lacks event log	Passed
	Human/contract checks bypass	Passed
	Random number generation/use vulnerability	N/A
	Fallback function misuse	Passed
	Race condition	Passed
	Logical vulnerability	Passed
	Features claimed	Passed
	Other programming issues	Moderated
Code	ode Function visibility not explicitly declared	
Specification	Var. storage location not explicitly declared	Passed
	Use keywords/functions to be deprecated	Passed
	Unused code	Passed
Gas	"Out of Gas" Issue	Passed
Optimization	Optimization High consumption 'for/while' loop	
	High consumption 'storage' storage	Passed
	Assert() misuse	Passed
Business Risk	The maximum limit for mintage is not set	Passed
	"Short Address" Attack	Passed
	"Double Spend" Attack	Passed

Overall Audit Result: PASSED

This is a private and confidential document. No part of this document should be disclosed to third party without prior written permission of EtherAuthority.

Business Risk Analysis

Category	Result
Buy Tax	0%
Sell Tax	0%
Cannot Buy	No
Cannot Sell	No
Max Tax	0%
Modify Tax	No
Fee Check	Not Detected
Is Honeypot	Not Detected
Trading Cooldown	Not Detected
Can Pause Trade?	Not Detected
Pause Transfer?	No
Max Tax?	No
Is it Anti-whale?	Not Detected
Is Anti-bot?	Not Detected
Is it a Blacklist?	No
Blacklist Check	No
Can Mint?	Yes
Is it a Proxy Contract?	No
Is it used Open Source?	No
External Call Risk?	No
Balance Modifiable?	No
Can Take Ownership?	No
Ownership Renounce?	No
Hidden Owner?	Not Detected
Self Destruction?	Not Detected
Auditor Confidence	High

Overall Audit Result: PASSED

This is a private and confidential document. No part of this document should be disclosed to third party without prior written permission of EtherAuthority.

Code Quality

This audit scope has 1 smart contract. Smart contracts contain Libraries, Smart contracts, inherits, and Interfaces. This is a compact and well-written smart contract.

The libraries in Aavegotchi GHST Token (GHST) are part of its logical algorithm. A library is a different type of smart contract that contains reusable code. Once deployed on the blockchain (only once), it is assigned a specific address and its properties/methods can be reused many times by other contracts in the Aavegotchi GHST Token (GHST).

The EtherAuthority team has not provided scenario and unit test scripts, which would have helped to determine the integrity of the code in an automated way.

Code parts are well commented on in the smart contracts. Ethereum's NatSpec commenting style is recommended.

Documentation

We were given an Aavegotchi GHST Token (GHST) smart contract code in the form of a <u>basescan</u> web link.

As mentioned above, code parts are well commented on. And the logic is straightforward. So it is easy to quickly understand the programming flow as well as complex code logic. Comments are very helpful in understanding the overall architecture of the protocol.

Use of Dependencies

As per our observation, the libraries used in this smart contract infrastructure are based on well-known industry standard open-source projects.

Apart from libraries, its functions are not used in external smart contract calls.

AS-IS overview

OptimismMintableERC20.sol

Functions

SI.	Functions	Туре	Observation	Conclusion
1	constructor	write	Passed	No Issue
2	onlyBridge	modifier	Passed	No Issue
3	mint	external	access only	No Issue
			Bridge	
4	burn	external	access only	No Issue
			Bridge	
5	supportsInterface	external	Passed	No Issue
6	I1Token	read	Identical value	Refer Audit
			for 3 functions	Findings
7	I2Bridge	read	Identical value	Refer Audit
			for 3 functions	Findings
8	remoteToken	read	Identical value	Refer Audit
			for 3 functions	Findings
9	bridge	read	Identical value	Refer Audit
			for 3 functions	Findings
10	name	read	Passed	No Issue
11	symbol	read	Passed	No Issue
12	decimals	read	Passed	No Issue
13	totalSupply	read	Passed	No Issue
14	balanceOf	read	Passed	No Issue
15	transfer	write	Passed	No Issue
16	allowance	read	Passed	No Issue
17	approve	write	Passed	No Issue
18	transferFrom	write	Passed	No Issue
19	increaseAllowance	write	Passed	No Issue
20	decreaseAllowance	write	Passed	No Issue
21	_transfer	internal	Passed	No Issue
22	mint	internal	Passed	No Issue
23	_burn	internal	Passed	No Issue
24	approve	internal	Passed	No Issue
25	_spendAllowance	internal	Passed	No Issue
26	beforeTokenTransfer	internal	Passed	No Issue
27	_afterTokenTransfer	internal	Passed	No Issue
28	version	read	Passed	No Issue

This is a private and confidential document. No part of this document should be disclosed to third party without prior written permission of EtherAuthority.

Audit Findings

Critical Severity

No Critical severity vulnerabilities were found.

High Severity

No High severity vulnerabilities were found.

Medium

No Medium-severity vulnerabilities were found.

Low

No Low-severity vulnerabilities were found.

Very Low / Informational / Best practices:


[I-01] Visibility can be external over the public:


Description:

Any functions which are not called internally should be declared as external. This saves some gas and is considered a good practice.

https://ethereum.stackexchange.com/questions/19380/external-vs-public-best-practices

[I-02] Identical value for 3 functions:





Description:

The same value has been returned by these 3 functions:

- BRIDGE
- I2Bridge()
- bridge() and remoteToken()

Recommendation: We suggest using only 1 function if the value is the same for both and the other can be removed.

This is a private and confidential document. No part of this document should be disclosed to third party without prior written permission of EtherAuthority.

Centralization

The Aavegotchi GHST Token (GHST) smart contract does not have any ownership control, **hence it is 100% decentralized.**

Therefore, there is **no** centralization risk.

Centralized Decentralized

This is a private and confidential document. No part of this document should be disclosed to third party without prior written permission of EtherAuthority.

Conclusion

We were given a contract code in the form of a <u>basescan</u> web link. And we have used all possible tests based on given objects as files. We observed 2 Informational issues in the smart contracts. but those are not critical. So, **it's good to go for the production**.

Since possible test cases can be unlimited for such smart contracts protocol, we provide no such guarantee of future outcomes. We have used all the latest static tools and manual observations to cover the maximum possible test cases to scan everything.

Smart contracts within the scope were manually reviewed and analyzed with static analysis tools. Smart Contract's high-level description of functionality was presented in the As-is overview section of the report.

The audit report contains all found security vulnerabilities and other issues in the reviewed code.

The security state of the reviewed smart contract, based on standard audit procedure scope, is **"Secured"**.

Our Methodology

We like to work with a transparent process and make our reviews a collaborative effort. The goals of our security audits are to improve the quality of the systems we review and aim for sufficient remediation to help protect users. The following is the methodology we use in our security audit process.

Manual Code Review:

In manually reviewing all of the code, we look for any potential issues with code logic, error handling, protocol and header parsing, cryptographic errors, and random number generators. We also watch for areas where more defensive programming could reduce the risk of future mistakes and speed up future audits. Although our primary focus is on the in-scope code, we examine dependency code and behavior when it is relevant to a particular line of investigation.

Vulnerability Analysis:

Our audit techniques included manual code analysis, user interface interaction, and white box penetration testing. We look at the project's website to get a high-level understanding of what functionality the software under review provides. We then meet with the developers to gain an appreciation of their vision of the software. We install and use the relevant software, exploring the user interactions and roles. While we do this, we brainstorm threat models and attack surfaces. We read design documentation, review other audit results, search for similar projects, examine source code dependencies, skim open issue tickets, and generally investigate details other than the implementation.

Documenting Results:

We follow a conservative, transparent process for analyzing potential security vulnerabilities and seeing them through successful remediation. Whenever a potential issue is discovered, we immediately create an Issue entry for it in this document, even though we have not yet verified the feasibility and impact of the issue. This process is conservative because we document our suspicions early even if they are later shown to not represent exploitable vulnerabilities. We generally follow a process of first documenting the suspicion with unresolved questions, and then confirming the issue through code analysis, live experimentation, or automated tests. Code analysis is the most tentative, and we strive to provide test code, log captures, or screenshots demonstrating our confirmation. After this, we analyze the feasibility of an attack in a live system.

Suggested Solutions:

We search for immediate mitigations that live deployments can take, and finally, we suggest the requirements for remediation engineering for future releases. The mitigation and remediation recommendations should be scrutinized by the developers and deployment engineers, and successful mitigation and remediation is an ongoing collaborative process after we deliver our report, and before the details are made public.

This is a private and confidential document. No part of this document should be disclosed to third party without prior written permission of EtherAuthority.

Disclaimers

EtherAuthority.io Disclaimer


EtherAuthority team has analyzed this smart contract in accordance with the best industry practices at the date of this report, in relation to: cybersecurity vulnerabilities and issues in smart contract source code, the details of which are disclosed in this report, (Source Code); the Source Code compilation, deployment and functionality (performing the intended functions).

Due to the fact that the total number of test cases is unlimited, the audit makes no statements or warranties on the security of the code. It also cannot be considered as a sufficient assessment regarding the utility and safety of the code, bug-free status or any other statements of the contract. While we have done our best in conducting the analysis and producing this report, it is important to note that you should not rely on this report only. We also suggest conducting a bug bounty program to confirm the high level of security of this smart contract.

Technical Disclaimer

Smart contracts are deployed and executed on the blockchain platform. The platform, its programming language, and other software related to the smart contract can have their own vulnerabilities that can lead to hacks. Thus, the audit can't guarantee the explicit security of the audited smart contracts.

Appendix Code Flow Diagram - Aavegotchi GHST Token (GHST)



This is a private and confidential document. No part of this document should be disclosed to third party without prior written permission of EtherAuthority.

Slither Results Log

Slither is a Solidity static analysis framework that uses vulnerability detectors, displays contract details, and provides an API for writing custom analyses. It helps developers identify vulnerabilities, improve code comprehension, and prototype custom analyses quickly. The analysis includes a report with warnings and errors, allowing developers to quickly prototype and fix issues.

We did the analysis of the project altogether. Below are the results.

OptimismMintableERC20.sol

NFO:Detectors: OptimismMintableERC20.constructor(address,address,string,string)._name (OptimismMintableERC20.sol#672) shadows: - ERC20._name (OptimismMintableERC20.sol#274) (state variable) OptimismMintableERC20.constructor(address,address,string,string)._symbol OptimismMintableERC20.sol#673) shadows: - ERC20._symbol (OptimismMintableERC20.sol#275) (state variable) NFO:Detectors: OptimismMintableERC20.constructor(address,address,string,string)._remoteToken OptimismMintableERC20.sol#671) lacks a zero-check on : • REMOTE_TOKEN = _remoteToken (OptimismMintableERC20.sol#675) - BRIDGE = _bridge (OptimismMintableERC20.sol#676) NFO:Detectors: Context._msgData() (OptimismMintableERC20.sol#177-179) is never used and should be Strings.toHexString(address) (OptimismMintableERC20.sol#166-168) is never used and should be removed be removed should be removed NFO:Detectors: Pragma version^0.8.0 (OptimismMintableERC20.sol#4) allows old versions

Reference

https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity **INFO:Detectors:** /ariable Semver.MAJOR_VERSION (OptimismMintableERC20.sol#221) is not in mixedCase /ariable Semver.MINOR_VERSION (OptimismMintableERC20.sol#226) is not in mixedCase /ariable Semver.PATCH_VERSION (OptimismMintableERC20.sol#231) is not in mixedCase OptimismMintableERC20.sol#685) is not in mixedCase OptimismMintableERC20.sol#685) is not in mixedCase OptimismMintableERC20.sol#701) is not in mixedCase OptimismMintableERC20.sol#718) is not in mixedCase /ariable OptimismMintableERC20.REMOTE_TOKEN (OptimismMintableERC20.sol#630) is not in mixedCase /ariable OptimismMintableERC20.BRIDGE (OptimismMintableERC20.sol#635) is not in mixedCase Reference: INFO:Detectors: Variable OptimismMintableERC20.REMOTE_TOKEN (OptimismMintableERC20.sol#630) is too (OptimismMintableERC20.sol#671) INFO:Slither:OptimismMintableERC20.sol analyzed (10 contracts with 93 detectors), 21 result(s) found

Solidity Static Analysis

Static code analysis is used to identify many common coding problems before a program is released. It involves examining the code manually or using tools to automate the process. Static code analysis tools can automatically scan the code without executing it.

OptimismMintableERC20.sol

Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function OptimismMintableERC20.mint is infinite: If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)

Pos: 163:4:

Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function OptimismMintableERC20.burn is infinite: If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)

Pos: 179:4:

Constant/View/Pure functions:

OptimismMintableERC20.supportsInterface(bytes4) : Is constant but potentially should not be. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis. Pos: 196:4:

Similar variable names:

Semver.version() : Variables have very similar names "MAJOR_VERSION" and "MINOR_VERSION". Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis. Pos: 88:37:

No return:

IOptimismMintableERC20.remoteToken(): Defines a return type but never explicitly returns a value.

Pos: 19:4:

Guard conditions:

Use "assert(x)" if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use "require(x)" if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.

Pos: 135:8:

Solhint Linter

Linters are the utility tools that analyze the given source code and report programming errors, bugs, and stylistic errors. For the Solidity language, there are some linter tools available that a developer can use to improve the quality of their Solidity contracts.

OptimismMintableERC20.sol

```
Compiler version >0.8.15 does not satisfy the ^0.5.8 semver
requirement
Pos: 1:1
Variable name must be in mixedCase
Pos: 5:49
Variable name must be in mixedCase
Pos: 5:54
Variable name must be in mixedCase
Pos: 5:59
Explicitly mark visibility in function (Set ignoreConstructors to
true if using solidity >=0.7.0)
Pos: 5:66
Variable name must be in mixedCase
Pos: 5:107
Variable name must be in mixedCase
Pos: 5:112
Error message for require is too long
Pos: 9:134
Explicitly mark visibility in function (Set ignoreConstructors to
true if using solidity >=0.7.0)
Pos: 5:146
```

Software analysis result:

These software reported many false positive results and some are informational issues. So, those issues can be safely ignored.



This is a private and confidential document. No part of this document should be disclosed to third party without prior written permission of EtherAuthority.